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Introduction 
 
In Ireland in 2002, on foot of the enactment of equality legislation and 
commitments made in successive national partnership agreements, the National 
Economic and Social Forum published A Strategic Policy Framework for Equality 
Issues. The Framework identified respect as one of the four ‘foundational equality 
objectives for contemporary Ireland’, along with redistribution, recognition and 
representation. The authors of the report commented:  
The evolution of social relations in Ireland today is undermining respect and 
recognition. The increased racial attacks … the ongoing religious/ethnic divisions 
in Northern Ireland, and the exclusion documented by those who are Travellers or 
lesbian or gay, make it clear that addressing status inequalities is a matter of 
urgent concern. Social relations of recognition and respect are essential for 
maintaining social unity and civility and for sustaining people’s sense of their 
own worth. Institutionalising respect for difference also matters because unequal 
respect can exacerbate both economic and political injustice. (National Economic 
and Social Forum 2002: 51)  
 
The concept of respect has figured in international policy documents in the human 
rights area for over 50 years. The United Nations Charter (United Nations 1945) 
and Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations 1948) both highlight 
the need for ‘respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’. 
Published two years later, the European Convention on Human Rights asserts that: 
‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence’ (Council of Europe 1950: Art. 8.1).1 Today, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which forms Part 2 of the European Constitution Treaty 
(Conference of the Representatives 2003), makes frequent use of the term 
‘respect’ – referring to the need for respect to be accorded to the individual’s 
dignity, physical and mental integrity, private and family life, home and 
communications; and calling for respect to be shown for the elderly, those with a 
disability, and those in the work place, and to be accorded to the media, 
educational establishments, religious and cultural institutions, and for academic 
endeavours and linguistic diversity.  
 
                                                        
1 The European Convention on Human Rights specifically excludes ‘drug addicts’, together with 
persons who may spread infectious diseases, persons of unsound mind, alcoholics and vagrants, 
from the article pledging the individual’s right to liberty and security of person (Council of Europe 
1950: Art. 5.1). Members of these groups may be lawfully detained. 
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A wide variety of non-governmental groups and sectors in contemporary Western 
society use the term in asserting their rights. The Internet search engine Google 
yielded some 20 million links mentioning respect: these links reveal a plethora of 
organisations and projects dedicated to engendering respect for minority groups 
within society – children, the aged, ethnic minorities, the subjects of research. In 
the entertainment world Joan Armatrading and Ali G call for – respect.  
 
Notwithstanding the ink expended on discussing the importance of respect, a 
number of commentators point to a continuing dearth of respect among socially-
excluded and disadvantaged sectors of society in the post-industrial world. For 
example, in discussing the shift from the inclusive society of the modern era to the 
exclusive society of the late modern era, Jock Young (1999) describes the ‘fate’ of 
young male unskilled workers who have fallen into long-term unemployment and 
criminality as the manufacturing sector has downsized. They have become:  
… bereft of social position and destiny … Young men facing such a denial of 
recognition turn, everywhere in the world, in what must almost be a 
criminological law, to the creation of cultures of machismo, to the mobilization 
of one of their only resources, physical strength, to the formation of gangs and to 
the defence of their own ‘turf’. Being denied the respect of others they create a 
subculture that revolves around masculine powers and ‘respect’. (Young 1999: 
12)   
 
In 2003 the British government published a white paper, Respect and 
Responsibility – Taking a Stand against Anti-Social Behaviour (Home 
Department 2003). It counters the calls for respect for all with a call for respect by 
all: 
As a society, our rights as individuals are based on the sense of responsibility we 
have towards others and to our families and communities. This means respecting 
each other’s property, respecting the streets and public places we share and 
respecting our neighbours’ right to live free from harassment and distress. It is 
the basis of civic society. 
This White Paper is all about this sense of responsibility: an acceptance that 
anti-social behaviour, in whatever guise, is not acceptable and together we will 
take responsibility to stamp it out, whenever we come across it. … 
Our aim is a ‘something for something’ society where we treat one another 
with respect and where we all share responsibility for taking a stand against what 
is unacceptable. (Home Department 2003: 3) 
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The prevalence of the term ‘respect’ in discourses around social justice and 
equality over the past 60-odd years, the reported dearth of respect in the lived 
experience of members of socially-excluded and disadvantaged groups, and the 
evident differences in interpretations of just what respect entails, indicate that 
exploring the nature of this concept in a sociological context is of relevance.  
 
It is the objective of this dissertation to explore how the concepts of respect and 
self-respect may be investigated in the context of everyday social life. It will 
pursue this objective by exploring the answers to three questions: 
 What are respect and self-respect? 
 How do they occur in everyday social life? 
 What theoretical and methodological considerations should the social 
researcher take into account in approaching the study of respect and self-
respect? 
 
My initial task in undertaking this dissertation was to survey recent discussions of 
the nature of the concepts of respect and self-respect, seeking to ascertain both 
what the concepts mean and how they are seen to function in and influence social 
life, and also to discern the features relevant to the work of the social researcher. 
The results of this task are set out in Chapter 1. It should be noted that the survey 
is an uncritical account, intended to uncover the broad range of normative 
understandings that may apply in everyday life rather than to try to adopt a 
particular position or perspective on the epistemology of respect.  
 
Equipped with this understanding of the concepts, I proceeded to read a selection 
of qualitative social research studies into the lives of illicit drug users. I focused 
exclusively on qualitative studies, on the assumption that they would yield 
complex and densely-nuanced evidence, indicating the presence or absence, and 
the nature of the functioning, of respect and self-respect. Quantitative research 
studies were avoided on the counter-assumption that terms and concepts would 
not be contextualised and consequently the possibilities for inferring the 
functioning of respect or self-respect would be restricted. A remarkable feature of 
the works that were consulted is the regularity with which the concepts of respect 
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and self-respect are used in explaining aspects of the lives and experiences of the 
research subjects. It should be noted that the studies consulted concentrate on the 
activities of drug users, with only incidental references to other actors in the world 
of illegal drugs, such as treatment professionals, law enforcement agents, the 
families and friends of drug users and their communities, and policy makers, 
although these other categories play key roles in relation to the functioning of 
respect in the lives of drug users. Furthermore, I am concerned entirely with the 
micro-level, with how the individual uses the concepts of respect and self-respect 
in their everyday life. The dynamics of respect between collectivities of people, 
and how this impacts on the lives of individual people and on society as a whole, 
in other words the politics of respect, is not considered.   
 
I read these research studies critically, seeking to discover (1) what they revealed 
about the functioning of respect, self-respect, and respect and self-respect jointly, 
in social life, and (2) what methodological approaches would facilitate the 
elucidation of the functioning of the concepts in everyday social life. I 
supplemented this reading with excursions into theoretical areas suggested by the 
content of the research studies, including interaction order, social structure, 
rational choice theory, risk theory and discourse analysis. Chapters 2 – 4 contain 
the results of this reading. They integrate discussion of how to approach the study 
of the various concepts and the type of evidence that the suggested approaches 
may be expected to yield, based on the evidence found in the chosen research 
studies. I have isolated out respect and self-respect for special consideration, 
considering other sociological concepts with which it is intimately related, such as 
identity, power and culture, only insofar as they impinge directly on the 
functioning of respect and self-respect. I have also not considered how the 
particular drug being used, the attitudes of the drug users at the time of drug use 
or the physical and social setting within which drug use occurs (cf. Zinberg 1984) 
may influence the patterns of respect and self-respect that may be in evidence. 
 
Finally, in the Conclusions, I draw on the findings of the preceding four chapters 
to suggest answers to the three questions posed in this introduction. 
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CHAPTER 1: UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPTS OF  
‘RESPECT’ AND ‘SELF-RESPECT’ 
 
 
1.0        Introduction 
 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (1989) the word ‘respect’ is derived 
from the Latin respectus, past participle of respicere, to look (back) at, to regard, 
to consider. The etymology of respect has moved some way from the original 
Latin. The modern meaning of the verb ‘to respect’ is ‘to treat or regard with 
deference, esteem, or honour; to feel or show respect for’. The substantive form 
(noun) is defined as ‘dread or fear, including deferential regard or esteem felt or 
shown towards a person or thing, or the condition or state of being esteemed or 
honoured’.  
 
In this chapter I briefly outline some contemporary debates in philosophy, ethics 
and political economy regarding the nature of respect and self-respect that are 
salient to sociological inquiry into the functioning of the concepts in everyday 
social life.2 In particular, this outline will focus on respect as a relationship 
between two entities, a subject and an object, in which the subject both identifies 
the object as needing attention or consideration, and assumes an attitude of 
deference towards or esteem for the object. I will also survey the possible 
consequences of the functioning, or lack of functioning of, respect in everyday 
social life, as an additional approach to investigating the functioning of the 
concept in everyday social life.  
 
1.1 Respect  
 
Dillon (2003) characterises the responsive relation contained in respect as follows: 
Respect is, most generally, a relation between a subject and an object, in which 
the subject responds to the object from a certain perspective in some appropriate 
                                                        
2 This chapter owes its approach to the epistemology of respect and self-respect to Robin S. Dillon 
(1995, 2003). I do not discuss in this chapter different philosophical accounts of the origins of 
respect, for example the Kantian perspective which argues that all human beings should be treated 
with respect because they are an end, possessing innate dignity, rather than a means, vis-à-vis the 
utilitarian perspective which argues that sentience rather than capacity for rational autonomy forms 
the ground for respect (Landesmann 1982). This discussion would be more necessary if the 
dissertation were going to discuss the politics of respect, including issues such as whether respect 
for others is a moral choice or a right to which every human being is entitled.  
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way. Respect necessarily has an object: respect is always for, directed toward, 
paid, to, felt about, shown for some object. While a very wide variety of things 
can be appropriate objects of one kind of respect or another, the subject of respect 
is always a person, that is, a conscious rational being capable of recognizing 
things, being self-conscious, and intentionally responsive to them, and being and 
expressing values with regard to them’ (Dillon 2003: Part 1.1). 
 
Dillon (2002) identifies the common elements in the respecting relationshsip 
between a subject and an object as attention, deference, valuing and appropriate 
conduct, and summarises the nature of the activity of respect as follows:  
… respect, most generally, has cognitive dimensions (beliefs, acknowledgments, 
judgments, deliberations, commitments), affective dimensions (emotions, 
feelings, ways of experiencing things), and conative dimensions (motivations, 
dispositions to act and forbear from acting). Some forms of respect also have 
valuation dimensions. On this analysis, then, respect is, most centrally, an 
attitude, or more broadly (since additional attitudes might be involved in 
respecting something), respect is a complex ‘way-of-being-towards-something. 
(Dillon 2003: Part 1.1) 
 
Dillon goes on to outline different approaches to describing the respectful attitude 
that a person may adopt towards an object. It may be viewed from the perspective 
of either the subject or the object. Darwall (1977) gives an account of recognition-
respect and appraisal-respect as experienced by the subject giving respect.   
 
Recognition-respect is based on assessment of factors external to the subject, 
whereby the subject weighs up in his deliberations some feature of the object and 
acts accordingly. The subject may be said to owe respect to the object.  
 
Appraisal-respect is exclusively an attitude of positive appraisal of a person’s 
excellence either as a person or as engaged in some pursuit. It does not call for 
any action on the part of the subject, nor restrict the subject’s range of possible 
actions. In short, in having appraisal-respect for a person, the subject judges the 
object to be deserving of or meriting respect because he manifests excellences of 
character which are deemed worthy of respect.  
 
Demonstrations of respect by a subject are not always what they seem. One may 
display recognition-respect without having respect for the object: for example, 
one may not respect a judge (as a judge) but behave in an appropriately respectful 
manner in the judge’s courtroom in order to avoid being charged with contempt. 
Similarly, one may have appraisal-respect for a person because the traits that one 
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respects in the person are useful to some purpose the subject has: such appraisal-
respect is instrumental rather than categorical, and therefore not genuine appraisal 
respect. 
 
Hudson (1980) distinguishes four kinds of respect arising in response to the object 
or some property possessed by the object – obstacle, directive, institutional or 
evaluative respect. The first three types have been associated with Darwall’s 
recognition-respect, and evaluative-respect with his appraisal-respect. Although 
this nesting is philosophically problematic, it helps to clarify the variety of 
recognition-respects that may be seen to occur within social relationships.  
 
Obstacle-respect applies to objects that are barriers or blockages in the path of 
the subject, obstacles in other words, which the subject must somehow overcome 
in order to achieve his goal or in order to avoid harm to himself irrespective of 
goals. You can show or have a healthy obstacle-respect for an object, in that its 
observance should help avoid some harmful consequences. You can also pay 
obstacle-respect in that you give careful consideration to the object rather than 
ignoring it, not owing to social conventions but owing to reason. 
 
Directive-respect is given to an object capable of being taken as a guide to action, 
for example a law or regulation, a request, a command, a wish or piece of advice. 
As with obstacle-respect, the critical element is the action that the subject takes: 
this action, conforming or not conforming with the directive, indicates whether 
the subject has directive-respect for the object. Objects with properties eliciting 
directive-respect may demand respect.  
 
Institutional-respect is given to social institutions, offices or positions, to 
persons or things representing such items, or to persons who fulfil roles defined 
by such items. It is shown by behaviour conforming to rules of conduct, respectful 
behaviour. You can show institutional-respect and you can have institutional-
respect. To have institutional-respect is to believe that the object of respect is a 
good thing to respect, from the point of view of co-operative living.  You may 
also pay institutional-respect to someone, because institutional-respect often 
requires deference.  
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Evaluative-respect is due to a person or to certain characteristics of a person. It 
involves a favourable attitude towards a person for particular reasons, which may 
be expressed or unexpressed (just as approval may or may not be expressed). The 
object of evaluative-respect may command respect, in that he attracts respect, or 
he may deserve or merit respect through his character or his actions or behaviours. 
You can show evaluative-respect, but it is of a different order from showing 
institutional-respect: for example, to show institutional-respect to a judge is to 
engage in the appropriate prescribed behaviours, but to show evaluative-respect 
you would not engage in respectful behaviour as such, but in actions such as 
praising the judge, taking his judgements seriously.  
 
Debate concerning the functioning of respect in a social context occurs along a 
continuum between dignity and character, between seeing the concepts as 
associated with culture and morality at the one extreme and with emotion and 
personality at the other. Two Harvard professors have championed the polar 
opposites.3 Drawing on the work of Kant and Rawls, Charles Fried (1970) 
proposes a moral framework within which human beings pursue rational actions 
and ends. He posits a ‘general principle of morality’, which is applicable to all 
rational actions and ends that impinge on other people. This abstract general 
principle underpins more specific principles, including justice and fairness, which 
in turn ‘score’, like a musical score, human beings’ rational actions and rational 
ends. By this means, Fried sees order, coherence and consistency introduced to 
human beings’ lives.  
 
Respect is central to the action of Fried’s ‘general principle of morality’. He 
defines respect as  ‘the disposition to entertain rational principles in accordance 
with the principle of morality – that is, rational principles which treat other 
persons implicated in them as ends rather than means’ (Fried 1970: 55). Through 
the working of the principle of morality, a person can recognise in his dealings 
with others the personality of the other person, can assume that his own rational 
ends and actions incorporate and are compatible with the rational ends and actions 
                                                        
3 Charles Fried, Professor of Law at Harvard, served in numerous roles in the Reagan 
administration including special assistant to the US attorney general from 1984 to 1985 and 
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of those with whom he interacts, and he can treat other persons as ends rather than 
means. Fried goes on to elaborate how this general principle of morality infuses a 
person’s  ‘life plan’ with its associated ‘risk budget’, and the way in which the 
individual, guided by the general principle of morality, and respect for others, will 
calculate the impact of his actions on society’s common ‘risk pool’.  
 
At the other end of the continuum, Judith Shklar (1984) argues that in liberal 
democratic societies the pursuit of egalitarianism militates against the functioning 
of respect as an independent moral concept. She suggests that it is not reasonable 
to assume that the moral self exists, apart from all social definition, and is 
therefore deserving of social respect. Rather, the respect that is accorded to the 
individual self in society tends to be because of the need to regard others as if 
social standing were a matter of indifference: ‘Not all of us are even convinced 
that all men are even entitled to a certain minimum of social respect. Only some 
of us think so. But most of us always act as if we really did believe it, and that is 
what counts’ (Shklar 1984: 77). In other words, insofar as respect is socially 
rather than independently and morally determined, it is hypocritical, but no less 
useful for being false. 
 
In the chapters that follow examples of the different kinds of respect outlined in 
this section will be given. Insights into the nature of the social context in which 
respect functions, and whether and how it is contingent on culture and morality or 
on emotion and personality, will also be provided. 
 
1.2     Self-Respect 
 
Self-respect is of a very different order from respect insofar as the subject and 
object are one in the same person. Dillon (2002) describes self-respect as 
something to do with the very structure and attunement of one’s life, having at its 
centre one’s sense of one’s own worth:  
Like a sense of humour, a sense of worth [self-respect] is a perceptual capacity, 
that is, a capacity to recognise and understand one’s worth (and a lot more 
besides), and a sensitivity to whatever threatens one’s worth and to what might 
enhance, protect, and sustain it. A sense of worth is also a valuing stance. To 
have a sense of worth is not simply to recognize that one has worth, but to regard 
                                                                                                                                                        
solicitor general from October 1985 to January 1989. Judith Shklar, former Professor of 
Government at Harvard, is noted for her ‘dystopic’ or ‘bare-bones’ liberalism (Benhabib 1994). 
13 
that fact as mattering a great deal. This makes one’s sense of worth motivational: 
it disposes one to protect one’s worth when it is threatened, to confirm it when 
necessary, to enhance it where possible, and so on. A person’s sense of worth is 
thus an engaged, concernful appreciation of her worth, a lived affirmation of it. It 
is at the same time not so much self-conscious and affectively present as it is a 
matter of assumption, construal, perspective, and disposition suffusing one’s 
thinking, feeling, and living.  Although in some contexts – as when one’s rights 
are challenged, degradation threatens, or circumstances call for taking stock of 
oneself – one’s worth and sense of worth (or lack thereof) may be at the center of 
one’s thoughts and feelings, in calmer contexts the sense of worth may operate as 
unconsciously as one’s sense of the solidness of the ground: completely taken for 
granted yet informing every move. (Dillon 1995: 20) 
 
 
Philosophically, two kinds of self-respect have been elaborated on – one focusing 
on the dignity of the person and valuing oneself as a human being, and the other 
focusing on the character of the person and enjoying a favourable attitude towards 
oneself. Dillon (2003: Part 4.1) distinguishes three kinds of dignity-based 
recognition self-respect.   
 
Equality self-respect, which refers to appreciation of oneself as a person among 
persons, a member of the moral community with a status and dignity equal to that 
of every other person in the community simply by virtue of being a person.  
 
Autonomy or responsibility self-respect, which leads to an appreciation of 
oneself as an agent, a being with the ability, responsibility and sufficient control 
to act autonomously. Persons who respect themselves as agents act in accordance 
with a standard, which may comprise a purpose, a set of goals, a role that has to 
be fulfilled, or a combination of all three.  
 
Identity self-respect refers to the person’s appreciation of the importance of 
having and living by a conception of life that gives expression to values and 
commitments as expressed in the pursuits and projects that contribute to an 
individuals’ identity. This kind of self-respect is not based on rights or merit, but 
on personal standards which may apply only to oneself, and which may be ideals 
or merely a minimum below which one does not go.  
 
Turning to evaluative self-respect, based on a subjective assessment of one own 
character, John Rawls (1971) sees it as a ‘primary good’ in the context of an 
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egalitarian society, considering it rational for individuals to want no matter what 
their conception of the good might be. Rawls does not distinguish between self-
respect and self-esteem. However, a number of commentators insist on the 
distinction, tending to see the former in moral and the latter in psychological 
terms. They suggest, moreover, that Rawls’ account of self-respect is in fact an 
account of self-esteem. Thus, self-esteem is defined as having confidence in one’s 
life plan, whereas self-respect is having a sense of one’s own personal worth 
(Moody-Adams 1992–93: 275); self-esteem may be affected by a wide range of 
features such as appearance, temperament, wit, physical capacities, while self-
respect relates to oneself as a person (Darwall 1977: 194). Originally, William 
James depicted self-esteem as determined by the ratio of one’s successes to one’s 
aspirations: it is regarded as neutral between ends, in that the successful pursuit of 
any end may enhance a person’s sense of self-esteem, and thus a person may 
enjoy self-esteem and yet be morally reprehensible (Thomas 1983: 255). 
Arguably, a person worthy of esteem by others is esteemed or admired by those 
others, but not necessarily respected. Similarly, a loss of self-esteem may lead to a 
sense of embarrassment (Modigliani 1968), but not necessarily shame, which is 
associated with a loss of self-respect (Deigh 1983: 134).  
 
Evaluative self-respect, as distinct from the Rawlsian self-esteem discussed 
above, has been described as following from recognition self-respect. A person 
sets and tries to live by certain standards of worth and then proceeds to assess her 
merit in terms of the extent to which she has achieved the standards set. 
Evaluative self-respect contains the judgement that one is or is becoming the 
worthy kind of person one seeks to be and, more significantly, that one is not in 
danger of becoming an unworthy kind of person. We earn or lose moral merit and 
thus deserve or don’t deserve evaluative-self-respect: we may or may not ‘come 
up to scratch’ (Telfer 1968: 108). Evaluative self-respect matters intensely to the 
individual concerned and can powerfully affect their self-identity and the shape 
and structure of their lives. The possibility of losing this evaluative self-respect 
through some action can lead a person to state, ‘I could never respect myself again 
if I were to …’ (Telfer 1968: 108). 
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In a social context, self-respect seems to be a less contested concept than respect. 
However, its integrity is often in doubt owing to the pervasive influence of 
particular ‘vices’ in modern societies: although self-respect is a sense that we 
carry with us always, it is activated, generated and maintained, and lost, in social 
interactions and exchanges with other people, whose self-respect is similarly 
engaged at such moments. Examples of two vices that can affect the functioning 
of self-respect are envy and snobbery. Jon Elster (1989a, 1999b) discusses how 
envy is driven by the individual’s need for self-respect:  
The first urge of envy is not ‘I want what he has’, but ‘I want him not to have 
what he has, because it makes me feel that I am less’. … a weakly envious person 
does not want anyone to have what he cannot have. A strongly envious person is 
even willing to give up part of what he has if that is a condition for bringing 
others down to his level. In both cases, the concern with self-respect is primary, 
and redistributive concerns are secondary. (Elster 1989a: 253) 
                        
Elster outlines two social norms that serve to control this private vice – ‘envy 
avoidance’ and ‘envy enjoyment’. The first imposes ‘rigid uniformity’, through 
means such promoting an egalitarian ethos on members of society, while the 
second creates the conditions for social co-operation through encouraging 
individuals to compete, specifically to provoke another’s envy, and to thereby 
elicit a competitive response from them. The functioning of self-respect will be 
contingent on the efficacy of these social norms in assuaging the emotions 
aroused by the feeling of envy.  
 
While not questioning the reality of self-respect, as she does the concept of 
respect, Judith Shklar (1984) suggests that the possibility of self-respect is 
diminished in modern democratic societies through the pervasive vice of 
‘snobbery’. She argues that individual achievement, a public attribute, has 
contributed to enhancing the status and prestige of some individuals over others, 
while a contrary drive towards pluralism has resulted in the proliferation of groups 
that include some and exclude others, create insiders and outsiders.  The result of 
both tendencies is snobbery, which Shklar suggests not only makes ‘inequality 
hurt’ but undermines our capacity for self-respect: ‘The snob fawns on his 
superiors and rejects his inferiors. And while he annoys and insults those who 
have to live with him, he injures himself as well, because he has lost the very 
possibility of self-respect’ (Shklar 1984: 87). 
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The continual accommodations of conflicting emotions and motivations will be a 
feature of the account of the functioning of self-respect provided in Chapter 3. As 
with respect, in the chapters that follow, examples of the different kinds of self-
respect outlined in this section will be given. 
 
1.3  Consequences of Respecting  
 
The following list highlights positive and negative feelings and emotions regularly 
linked with respect, which may be regarded as the direct consequences of the 
functioning of respect. Taylor (1985: 175) suggests that there are more negative 
emotions connected with a person’s integrity, and self-respect, than positive 
emotions, because the self may be thought of as being in a state of equilibrium 
and this is affected only by something going wrong: it can be upset but not 
improved.4  
 
Self-Respect  
The most prominent positive consequence associated with the functioning of 
respect in a social situation – both for the subject and for the object – is self-
respect. A person who respects himself, understands and values his moral status 
and rights as a person, is likely to recognise the same moral status and rights in 
others. As a result, giving recognition-respect to others is likely to reinforce the 
giver’s own recognition self-respect. When a subject denies recognition-respect to 
another person, arguably it has the same consequence for the subject as when he 
gives recognition-respect. By excluding others from the category of those 
deserving recognition-respect, he is affirming his own moral status and worth. His 
sense of self-respect is enhanced. The person who receives recognition-respect of 
the institutional kind will also experience an enhancement of their sense of dignity 
and self-worth, their recognition self-respect. By the same token, if a person is 
denied recognition-respect, he will suffer a diminution of his self-respect. 
 
 
                                                        
4 In describing dominant themes of inmate culture in ‘total institutions’, Goffman (1961) notes 
how the inmate ‘tends to develop a story, a line, a sad tale – a kind of lamentation and apologia – 
which he constantly tells to his fellows as a means of accounting for his present low estate’ (p. 66), 
and goes on to observe, ‘… the more the person’s past forces him out of apparent alignment with 
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Pride  
Pride (Dillon 2003: Section 4.1) may be associated with recognition self-respect: 
it may be expressed either through staking a claim to or celebrating one’s status as 
equal to others, or through declining to do something deemed unworthy because it 
is inconsistent with one’s sense of dignity. Pride may also be associated with 
evaluation self-respect and/or self-esteem: for example, one may take satisfaction 
or pride in one’s achievements, or one may display an excessively high opinion of 
one’s qualities, accomplishments or status. Displays of pride in connection with 
evaluation self-respect may show one up in a negative light, as arrogant or 
contemptuous of others.  
 
Respectability  
There are two distinct categories of meaning of ‘respectability’ in modern 
Western society. On the one hand, it connotes deserving respect, or being of 
acceptable social standing. This category indicates that a person is respected on 
the basis of his conforming to the socially dominant norms, his possession of 
socially-approved attributes and behaviours. A person who is deemed respectable 
in this sense enjoys social acceptance and recognition, legitimacy, affiliations 
within the wider social group, and competitive advantage, be it in the social, 
cultural or economic arenas. Potentially, any group may bestow this stamp of 
respectability on its members – a professional (Macdonald 1989), racial (Gross 
1997) or class-based (Waddington 1999) group, or indeed a group of illicit drug 
users (Faupel 1991: 25–26). 
 
The second, pejorative definition of respectability sees it as relating to something 
that is primly conventional. A person who is respectable in this sense will tend to 
follow the prevailing social norms unquestioningly, be conformist and lack 
individuality.  Robert Louis Stevenson went further, accusing such respectable 
people of being devoid of moral fibre and craven: ‘… to do anything because 
others do it, and not because the thing is good, or kind, or honest in its own right, 
is to resign all moral control and captaincy upon yourself,… The respectable are 
not led so much by any desire for applause as by a positive need for countenance. 
                                                                                                                                                        
central moral values, the more often he seems to be  compelled to tell his sad tale …it is among 
convicts, “winos”, and prostitutes that one seems to obtain sad tales the most readily’ (p. 140). 
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The weaker and the tamer the man, the more will he require this support’ 
(Stevenson 1881).    
 
Respectability in both senses has the properties of being ad hominem and 
negotiable. It is also exclusionary in that people who do not conform with the 
socially determined requirements are omitted from the ranks of the respectable 
and, as a result, may suffer from a lack of access to resources, both tangible and 
intangible (Waddington 1999). 
 
Shame 
The converse of pride is shame, which is closely associated with the loss of self-
respect. It is occasioned through failure to reach some standard or goal closely 
associated with one’s self-conception. It occurs through the agency of the person 
who experiences it, rather than through the action of others, which is discussed 
below under ‘humiliation’ and  ‘stigmatisation’. The precise nature of shame and 
its relationship to self-respect is nevertheless contested.  
 
John Rawls (1971) views the person as ‘author’ of his own worth, through acting 
in ways that augment or diminish it. He sees shame as a reaction to the loss of 
worth and the fear of this loss regulates a person’s conduct. Rawls distinguishes 
between natural shame, which is due to injury to self-esteem owing to failure to 
exercise one’s excellences. Regret may follow from natural shame. Moral shame 
on the other hand is due to actions or traits that reveal the absence of the 
excellences needed to achieve one’s life plan. Moral shame arises from failure to 
achieve self-command and its attendant excellences of strength, courage and self-
control. Guilt arises from realising you have acted wrongly, transgressed the 
rights of others.  
 
Other commentators see shame not as a response to loss of self-respect through 
personal failure, but as a mechanism for ensuring that when one’s sense of worth 
is threatened, it remains undamaged and undiminished: shame is a self-protective 
emotion. ‘… it may prevent the person concerned from putting himself into a 
certain position, or make him aware he ought not to be in the position in which he 
finds himself’ (Taylor 1985: 161).Taylor argues that shame occurs when one’s 
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sense of worth is diminished through frustration of one’s expectations and the 
attendant values. She argues that if someone has self-respect, she will under 
certain circumstances also feel shame, but if she has no self-respect she will not 
regard any circumstances as shame-producing: ‘Loss of self-respect and loss of 
the capacity for feeling shame go hand in hand’ (Taylor 1985: 161).  
 
Alternatively, Deigh (1983) suggests that a sense of self-worth is predicated not 
so much on what you do, as on what you are, on your identity, be it based on 
class, gender, race, culture or occupation. A betrayal of this identity, and the threat 
of demeaning treatment by others as a result, can lead to feelings of shame. The 
shame acts as a form of ‘self-control that works to restrain one from giving the 
appearance of lesser worth and self-respect that works to cover up shameful things 
that, having come to light, give one such appearance’ (Deigh 1983: 152). This 
kind of shame is often manifested in acts of concealment, for example covering 
one’s face, hiding from others, or blushing.  
 
Humiliation 
Unlike shame, humiliation is inflicted on a person by some other person or 
persons. It is a loss of dignity owing to the agency of some other. Goffman 
describes its effect in his account of the experience of a person (inmate) entering a 
‘total institution’: 
The recruit comes into the establishment with a conception of himself made 
possible by certain stable social arrangements in his home world. Upon entrance, 
he is immediately stripped of the support provided by these arrangements. In the 
accurate language of some of our oldest total institutions, he begins a series of 
abasements, degradations, humiliations, and profanations of self. His self is 
systematically, if often unintentionally, mortified. (Goffman 1961a: 24) 
 
It is argued that humiliation leads to loss of self-esteem rather than self-respect. 
When a person believes that she does not get the recognition she ought to have, 
that she deserves better than she gets, this does not lead to a loss of self-respect 
unless she thinks that she is worth less than she was on account of having been 
humiliated (Taylor 1995, p. 159, 174).  
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Stigmatisation 
 A person is stigmatised through being perceived, and behaving, as having a 
stigma, which is defined as ‘any condition, attribution, trait, or behaviour that 
symbolically marks the bearer off as “culturally unacceptable” or “inferior” and 
has as its subjective referent the notion of shame or disgrace’ (Williams 2000: 
213–214). The stigma may be physical, behavioural or cultural, and it may be 
immediately obvious to others or it may not be immediately discernible. 
 
Stigmatisation has been the subject of considerable deliberation (Goffman 1967; 
Page 1984), and the results of this activity indicate that a form of recognition-
respect, which focuses on distinguishing between ‘normal’ and ‘non-normal’, is at 
play within the process of stigmatisation. A person who perceives and treats 
another as having a stigma may do so either intentionally or unintentionally. 
Unintentional stigmatisation occurs particularly with physical stigma, where the 
non-stigmatised may be over-sympathetic to the person with the perceived stigma 
or may ignore the person completely owing to embarrassment.  
 
A person with a stigma may recognise the stigma directly or through observing 
the reactions of others. For example, over-compensation by others for a physical 
stigma, or adverse comments by others regarding one’s cultural practices, may 
alert a person to being different. Reactions to finding themselves stigmatised vary 
from person to person: some become angry, others feel humiliated.  
 
People’s actions subsequent to acknowledging themselves as stigmatised also 
vary.  Some may accept the possession of the stigma and undertake to make 
changes in order to return to a state of ‘normalcy’; others may reject the 
stigmatisation but fail to do anything to alter the situation; yet others may either 
individually or collectively challenge the stigmatisation, and reject the prevailing 
social norms by establishing their own alternative norm.  
 
1.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
Respect refers to a process by means of which a person attaches a social value to 
another person. Two particular features of respect affect how the sociologist may 
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investigate its functioning in everyday social life. Firstly, it is a function of social 
relations and interactions. It requires both a subject, to give or withdraw respect, 
and an object, to receive or lose respect. Secondly, respect is a public and 
accessible process. The subject’s activities of attending, deferring, valuing and 
pursuing a particular course of conduct, and the object’s responses, such as pride 
or shame, may be observed by the social researcher. 
 
Self-respect is a person’s sense of self-worth. Although a rational process like 
respecting, the activity of respecting oneself occurs in a very different manner 
from the activity of respecting. The activities that go into forming a person’s sense 
of self-respect are private functions. Self-respect may, however, be inferred from 
public demonstrations. Although usually unspoken, it may be actualised in 
‘moments of truth’, such as when a person makes a decision consistent with her 
values and beliefs, takes steps to gain control of her life, wins status, prestige and 
recognition from others, commits to some pursuit whose accomplishment gives a 
sense of pride, or performs some act indicating respect for another.  
 
Studying the functioning of respect and self-respect in social contexts may be 
complicated by several contingencies. For example, respect may be intentionally 
false, being displayed in order to achieve some ulterior purpose, be it to avoid 
some eventuality or to achieve a particular outcome. Self-respect may not 
logically be subject to deliberate falsification, but it may fall prey to being 
compromised, as when a person diminishes their self-respect through 
disrespecting another person (being a snob), or when a person inadvertently has a 
false sense of self-respect owing to self-delusion. Furthermore, negative respect, 
for example absences or failures of respect in social life, has been found to be 
more easily observable than evidence of the positive functioning of the concepts, 
although this phenomenon may be the result of observer bias or failure to look for 
evidence pertaining to positive respect and self-respect.   
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CHAPTER 2: RESPECT –  
VALUING PEOPLE OR JOINING THE ‘IN’ CROWD 
 
 
2.0       Introduction 
 
At the conclusion of Chapter 1, respect was defined, for the purposes of 
sociological investigation, as the means by which a person attaches a social value 
to another person. It was also noted that aspects of this process can be observed 
occurring in public, in interactions between people, in the conduct of people 
towards other people, as evidenced for example in stigmatisation, and in 
behaviours conveying feelings of pride or shame. In this chapter research 
approaches that serve to reveal the functioning of respect in social interactions, 
and the ways in which social structures and constraints affect the functioning of 
respect in everyday social life, are explored. 
 
2.1      Rules of Conduct 
 
The work of Erving Goffman on the interaction order provides a way into the 
question of how respect occurs in social interactions. His essay ‘The Nature of 
Deference and Demeanour’ (1967), which provides a road map of the ceremonial 
‘rules of conduct’ that bind individuals together and into the wider society, may 
be read as an account specifically of how respect functions in face-to-face 
interactions. 
 
Goffman’s ‘rules of conduct’ provide a guide for ‘suitable and just actions’. They 
generate a set of obligations and expectations for each actor, which are based on a 
particular image of self. Acts that are subject to these rules are termed 
communications, confirmations and expressions of the image of the self. The self 
that is so expressed is not the total person but ‘a special capacity, a status’.  
 
Bypassing ‘substantive’ rules of conduct, embodied in laws, morality and ethics, 
which he sees as having significance in their own right, Goffman focuses on 
‘ceremonial’ rules of conduct. These rules are a conventionalised means of 
communication by which an individual expresses his character or conveys his 
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appreciation of other participants in a face-to-face interaction. Described with 
Goffman’s customary Proust-like eye for detail, the enactment of these rules 
amounts to an elaborate and intricate pas de deux, the results of which confirm 
each dancer’s status in society and bind them into the wider social network. The 
two principal routines are deference and demeanour, in which both actors engage. 
 
Deference is defined as ‘that component of activity which functions as a symbolic 
means by which appreciation is regularly conveyed to a recipient of this recipient, 
or of something of which this recipient is taken as a symbol, extension or agent’ 
(p. 56), in other words recognition-respect. Although a person may desire, earn or 
deserve deference, Goffman notes that he may not give it to himself: he must seek 
it from others. The giving of deference is based on two considerations. Firstly, the 
giver must have regard for the recipient, and this regard may derive from 
‘respectful awe’, or from capacity-esteem, or feelings of trust or affection and 
belongingness. Regard may be feigned. A person may simply give it to someone 
because he is ‘an instance of a category, or a representative of something, and that 
they are giving him his due not because of what they think of him “personally” 
but in spite of it. … By easily showing a regard he does not have, the actor can 
feel that he is preserving a kind of inner autonomy, holding off the ceremonial 
order by the very act of upholding it’ (p. 58). A corollary of this is that people 
should accept signs of deference without making a direct appeal to the honorific 
definitions of a situation. Secondly, the person who defers is making a type of 
promise, expressing his pledge to treat the recipient in a certain way in the future 
that is consistent with the image of self that the recipient has built through his 
application of the ceremonial rules of conduct. 
 
Goffman details two kinds of contradictory deference rituals – avoidance and 
presentational. Avoidance rituals may include keeping an appropriate social 
distance from the recipient, avoiding certain topics of conversation. Presentational 
rituals include choosing the appropriate form of greeting or performing small 
services that attest to how he regards the recipient. 
 
The second routine, demeanour, is defined as ‘that element of the individual’s 
ceremonial behaviour typically conveyed through deportment, dress and bearing, 
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which serves to express to those in his immediate presence that he is a person of 
certain desirable or undesirable qualities’ (p. 77). Notwithstanding the 
individual’s choice of dress and bearing, other people determine a person’s 
demeanour by interpreting the way a person handles himself in social intercourse. 
A person cannot simply announce or behave as if he possesses a particular kind of 
demeanour, although such attempts may lead others to impute such attributes to 
him. A person who fails to adopt a demeanour may be accused of having no self-
respect or holding himself too cheaply in his own eyes.   
 
The two following passages, taken from a newsletter published for drug users in 
Dublin, indicate how importantly two heroin users consider the interaction rituals 
that they experience when attending drug treatment clinics, and in particular the 
manner in which deference is shown to them, and the implications of these 
presentational and avoidance rituals for establishing whether respect is present in 
the interactions:  
Cork Street [a drug treatment centre] is absolutely fabulous. They have the 
utmost respect for people down there. When I was in Castle Street a few of the 
Porters (now called General Assistants) were a bit cheeky but down in Cork 
Street, when you go in the morning time, they offer you tea and everything. You 
notice a complete difference. Each Christmas they have parties and buy presents 
for the kids. The Doctors are very good; they really helped me out a lot and I feel 
that everything I say is confidential. … Overall, Cork Street are very good with 
people and treat them with a lot of respect. (Brass Munkie 2000: 4)  
 
No thought goes into why the person has slipped [used benzodiazepines, cocaine 
or opiates], no excuses are entertained and no help is offered. Just punishment 
and dire warnings. Even if you are doing well, and have been ‘clean’ for 6 or 9 
months, there is no encouragement. But as soon as you slip it’s ‘oh, and you were 
doing so well!’ Why isn’t there encouragement for those ‘doing so well’? 
Admittedly, you can earn ‘takeaways’ (methadone for self-administration] for 
‘being good’, but slip once and you are back to square one. (Brass Munkie 2000: 
3) 
 
In describing the analytical relation between deference and demeanour, Goffman 
emphasises that they are separate activities, both performed by each individual in 
a complementary but interdependent relationship. Thus, in displaying a 
demeanour, person A adopts behaviours that point to the qualities associated with 
the social position he holds and that facilitate person B in adopting a deferential 
response appropriate to A’s social position. In adopting a deferential manner 
towards A, B displays attitudes and behaviours that reflect his own social position 
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vis-à-vis the social position that she perceives A to hold. As Goffman puts it, ‘ 
…the image of himself the individual owes it to others to maintain through his 
conduct [his ‘demeanour image’] is a kind of justification and compensation for 
the image of him that others are obliged to express through their deference to him 
[their ‘deference image’]. Each of the two images in fact may act as a guarantee 
and check upon the other’ (p. 83). In this ‘joint ceremonial labour’ that produces 
deference and demeanour, no person can be the sole author of their own ‘respect-
standing’.5 Each person can only paint certain parts of the picture (their 
demeanour image), while allowing others to complete the picture through the 
deference that they are enabled to show in response to the person’s demeanour 
image (their deference image).  
 
In the mid-1960s symbolic interaction theorist Herbert Blumer (1967) led a 
research study into drug use among young, disadvantaged people in Oakland, 
California. Involving over 200 young people in all, the research was based on 
extensive personal interviews, delving into the interviewees’ life history 
experiences, with each of the 40-odd central figures in the study, some psycho-
drama and participant observation. 6  The objective was to develop a realistic 
picture of youthful drug use and ascertain how such use was incorporated in the 
general round of life of those who used drugs.  
 
Describing four distinct categories of youthful drug users, Blumer describes what 
amount to demeanour and deference routines, which also serve to indicate the way 
in which respect functions in this world of youthful drug users. For example, the 
adolescent ‘rowdy dudes’ are recognisable by their distinctive ‘demeanour image’ 
– ‘impulsive and unrestrained expressions of violence, often in public, 
                                                        
5 Wolff (1998) defines ‘respect-standing’ as ‘the degree of respect other people have for me. If I 
am treated with contempt this will lead me to believe that I have low respect-standing; if treated 
decently I will believe that my respect-standing is high. It is insulting to be treated as if one is of 
lower respect-standing than is due, and demeaning to do, or be required to do, anything that might 
reasonably be expected to lower your respect-standing’ (Wolff 1998: 107; italics in original). 
6 The research project gathered information on matters such as how youngsters got into drug use; conditions 
and situations under which they use drugs; variations in drug use between different types of groups; lines of 
progression in the use of drugs; different types of drug users and different types of drug involvement; how 
drug use was viewed; self-conceptions; experiences of using drugs; their views of non-drug-users; 
experiences with family members, school officials and police officials regarding drug use; obtaining and 
distributing drugs; the extent of their drug use; place of drugs in the general routine of their life; their views 
on the illegal status of drugs and the risks to which that exposes them (Blumer 1967: 9). 
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aggressiveness, drinking, and use of drugs’ (p. 17). Others adopt a ‘deference 
image’ characterised by Blumer as ‘shunning the rowdy dudes’ – ‘Outside their 
own ranks they tend to be excluded from parties, dances, social gatherings and 
intimate association. Even youngsters fairly close to them will shy away from 
engaging in their escapades through fear of getting into trouble or being arrested’ 
(p. 22). The rowdy dudes are also a marked target for punitive action by the 
authorities and as a result are largely excluded from getting access to the drug 
market, for fear of drawing others to the attention of the police.  These 
demeanour/deference routines are indicative of the functioning of recognition 
obstacle-respect.  
 
Among the various types that Blumer identifies within the ‘cool’ population, the 
‘pot head’ displays perhaps the coolest ‘demeanour image’, which may be 
expected to command considerable recognition institutional-respect from his 
peers, expressed through appropriate ‘deference demeanours’:  
The average weed head among Oakland youth is respected by other adolescents 
from different social class backgrounds. In his daily life contacts he projects an 
image of a calm, sensible, solitary figure, soft-spoken and personable. He takes 
great pride in his appearance, … Many girls admire him, although he may have 
many steady girlfriends. Interwoven with his speech pattern is a colorful 
vocabulary of drug argot, combined with slight hand gestures and facial 
expressions which make him appear loose, good-natured, and self-confident. 
When strolling down the street, his eyes continually dart about. His sensitivity to 
police is remarkable. Above all he believes himself to be colorful, intelligent, 
daring, profoundly aware of the street scene, in complete self-control, and most 
important, a unique person worthy of respect. Although lodged in areas where 
violence may readily occur, he will resort to violence only if ‘pushed’ or 
‘sounded on’ to the point where he must defend his self-respect. (p. 32) 
 
Two recently-published resource documents recommending protocols for 
providing methadone substitution treatment for heroin users, prepared for 
treatment providers, indicate how the steps of this ceremonial dance of deference 
and demeanour may be conducted between members of different socio-economic 
groups – heroin addicts and medical professionals. Best Practices: Methadone 
Maintenance Treatment (Jamieson, Beals, Lalonde and Associates Inc 2002), 
published in Canada, outlines the ‘rules of conduct’ for interactions between a 
range of different treatment professionals and the drug user, who may be either a 
patient or a client. Treatment professionals are recommended to adopt a 
‘client/patient centred approach’ that would include:  
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 recognizing and accepting that each person who is dependent on opioids who enters 
treatment does so with widely varying experiences, expectations and needs; 
 recognizing the impact of marginalisation and emphasizing empowerment; 
 respecting clients’/patients’ dignity; 
 respecting clients’/patients’ choices, particularly concerning their treatment goals; 
 encouraging and facilitating client/patient involvement in decision-making at the 
individual and program levels; 
 fostering a collaborative, relationship-building approach between clients/patients and 
program team members. (Jamieson et al. 2002: 22) 
 
This ‘client/patient centred approach’ indicates the potential for a symmetrical or 
balanced relationship between treatment provider and client/patient in terms of 
showing recognition-respect for one another, as the treatment provider is 
recommended to develop a ‘deference image’ that emphasises recognition and 
respect for the other’s status as client/patient, and in response the client/patient 
may be expected to adopt a ‘deference image’ that will see them participating in 
decision-making and collaborating in their own treatment.   
 
The clinical guidelines produced by the Irish College of General Practitioners 
(ICGP), on the other hand, indicate that, in Goffman’s terms, an asymmetrical 
relationship between treatment provider and drug user has the potential develop if 
the guidelines are implemented to the letter. Intended for use by GPs managing 
patients in the primary care setting, the aim of the guidelines is to facilitate GPs in 
providing ‘safe and effective care for drug dependent patients’.  The guidelines 
comment, ‘Drug users respond best to care and concern on the one hand and firm 
and consistent boundaries on the other. In order to provide such boundaries, 
practices may benefit from an agreed written policy about working with drug 
users’ (ICGP 2003: 8). An appendix to the guidelines includes a sample written 
policy to be signed by the patient and doctor. In relation to conduct, it addresses 
the drug user as follows: 
You are now receiving a regular prescription for addictive medication and we ask you 
to accept the following conditions and behave respectfully towards practice staff. 
1. I agree to attend appointments promptly and quietly. 
2. I agree to attend my appointment unaccompanied whenever possible. 
3. I agree not to upset the Receptionist or other patients in the waiting room. 
Behaviour outside these limits may result in the Receptionist or the Doctor asking 
you to leave the Surgery premises. … 
I have read the above conditions, I understand what they mean and I agree to 
abide by them. If I do not abide by these rules then I understand that certain sanctions 
may be imposed. I understand that these sanctions are at the discretion of the Doctor 
… (ICGP 2003: 44) 
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This sample agreement recommends an initial ‘deference image’ towards the drug 
user based on the assumption that the drug user’s initial ‘demeanour image’ will 
be disrespectful and disruptive. Applying Goffman’s analysis, it is possible to 
speculate how such an asymmetrical  starting point will lead to a spiralling mutual 
display of disrespect, as the drug user adjusts his ‘demeanour image’ in response 
to the ‘deference’ shown to him.  
 
2.2 Seeking Recognition and Acceptance  
 
While the focus in this section remains on the individual person, attention shifts 
from face-to-face interaction to interactions with others as social groupings. It 
looks at the efforts of both drug users and also social researchers to gain social 
acceptance and recognition, i.e. recognition-respect, for drug users as human 
beings. 
 
In a classic study of ‘outsiders’, Becker (1963) reports on interviews with 50 
marijuana users, in which he focuses on the respondents’ ‘career’ in marijuana 
use,7 changes in their attitude toward marijuana and their actual use of it, and the 
reasons for these changes. To explain this career progression, he uses a sequential, 
three-stage model whereby a person becomes ‘labelled’ a deviant as a result of 
processes involving responses from other people. Becker’s account incidentally 
describes how the concept of respect plays a part throughout this labelling 
process, as the person seeks respect from various sources. 
1. A person commits a ‘non-conforming act’, that is, an act which breaks some 
rule of society, such as consuming marijuana. The person may only commit 
the act once, or she may continue to commit it over a long period of time. In 
the latter case, she develops ‘deviant motives and interests’ (p. 30) through a 
process of learning from others, insiders, the pleasures and rewards of the 
activity. Becker notes that, in this initial stage, the marijuana user tries to 
conceal her drug use from those in the outsider group whose respect and 
acceptance she requires both practically and emotionally (pp. 66–67). 
                                                        
7 See Chapter 3.1 for a discussion of the application of the career framework to the lives of drug users. 
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2. When the person is publicly exposed, or caught, engaging in the non-
conforming act, she is labelled a deviant. Being branded deviant has important 
consequences for the person’s future social participation: ‘Committing the 
improper act and being publicly caught at it place him in a new status. He has 
been revealed as a different kind of person from the kind he was supposed to 
be. He is labeled a “fairy”, “dope fiend”, “nut” or “lunatic”, and treated 
accordingly’ (p. 32). Becker reports on research,8 which found ‘…that drug 
addicts frequently attempt to cure themselves and that the motivation 
underlying their attempts is an effort to show non-addicts whose opinions they 
respect that they are really not as bad as they are thought to be. On breaking 
their habit successfully, they find, to their dismay, that people still treat them 
as though they were addicts (on the premise, apparently, of “once a junkie, 
always a junkie”)’ (p. 37).  
3. Continuing with her non-conforming act, the person moves into an organised, 
deviant community of like-minded people. She transfers her moral allegiances 
to the insider drug-using group, which has rejected as inaccurate society’s 
stereotype of the drug user as a ‘dope fiend’, one who is a slave to a drug and 
weak-willed, and cannot manage her own welfare or control her behaviour 
rationally. Furthermore, the deviant group rationalises its position, both 
justifying its own activities and repudiating conventional moral rules and 
institutions. Reporting on a study of the culture of a deviant group, jazz 
musicians in Chicago, and their occupational careers, Becker (1963: Ch. 5–6) 
makes regular reference to the importance of maintaining respect for their 
calling as a motivation underpinning their behaviours towards themselves and 
towards outsiders.  
 
In a paper, ‘Labelling Theory Reconsidered’, first presented in 1971 and printed 
in subsequent editions of Outsiders, Becker rejects the claim that ‘labelling’ 
constitutes a ‘theory’ (cf. Williams 1976). Becker argues that the labelling 
approach does not seek to explain deviant behaviours such as illicit drug use so 
much as ‘enlarge the area taken into consideration in the study of deviant 
phenomena by including in it activities of others than the allegedly deviant actor’ 
                                                        
8 Marsh Ray. 1961. ‘The Cycle of Abstinence and Relapse among Heroin Addicts’. Social Problems 9 (Fall): 
132–140.  
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(Becker 1963: 179). Becker renames the approach ‘an interactionist theory of 
deviance’ (p. 181), in which he emphasises the value of regarding deviance as 
‘collective action’.  
 
In exploring the potential of exploring deviance as collective action, Becker 
highlights an important feature relevant to the investigation of the functioning of 
respect: ‘When we see deviance as collective action, we immediately see that 
people act with an eye to the responses of others involved in that action. They take 
into account the way their fellows will evaluate what they do, and how that 
evaluation will affect their prestige and rank’ (p. 183). He cites as an example the 
way in which delinquents may deliberately get into trouble ‘because they wanted 
to maintain the positions of esteem they held in their gangs’. Elsewhere he 
discusses how members of mainstream occupations and professions (e.g. janitors, 
musicians, lawyers, physicians) all feel the need to justify their work and win the 
respect of others. He discusses the double bind of the law enforcement agent or 
rule enforcer, the person who apprehends people engaged in illegal activities such 
as drug dealing or drug use. On the one hand, the rule enforcer must demonstrate 
to others that the ‘problem’ she is employed to deal with still exists and therefore 
her services are still required; on the other hand, she must show that her efforts are 
paying dividends, that the problem is approaching solution through her agency. 
She will seek to gain recognition institutional-respect for her position through 
promoting these messages, and also through giving off a pessimistic view of the 
state of the world and scepticism regarding the prospects of attempts to reform 
rule-breakers. In presenting to the rule breakers themselves, she will seek to 
‘demand’ their recognition (obstacle- or directive-) respect: 
… a rule enforcer is likely to believe that it is necessary for the people he deals 
with to respect him. If they do not, it will be very difficult to do his job; his 
feeling of security in his work will be lost. Therefore, a good deal of enforcement 
activity is devoted not to the actual enforcement of rules, but to coercing respect 
from the people the enforcer deals with. This means that one may be labeled as 
deviant not because he has actually broken a rule, but because he has shown 
disrespect to the enforcer of the rule’ (p. 158).  
 
Members of the symbolic interactionist tradition in sociology have been vocal in 
proclaiming the need for a respectful relationship between researcher and 
researched. Blumer (1967:9) emphasises the need to win the respect of his 
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youthful drug-using research subjects. In order to get ‘frank and honest accounts’ 
about their experiences, he needed to overcome the suspicion and distrust of the 
youths and reduce the temptation for them to ‘con’ outsiders by deliberately 
fooling them or by compliantly supplying the kinds of answers they thought the 
investigators wanted. Proponents of the career framework approach to studying 
drug users, an approach also associated with the symbolic interactionist 
perspective (see Chapter 3.1), also proclaim the need to respect drug users: ‘Little 
progress will be made as long as policy makers and helping professionals continue 
to define drug users as inherently deficient people – sick, inept, unambitious, or 
incorrigible. Drug initiates must be seen for what they are, normal people from all 
strata of American society who find more rewards in using drugs than in 
refraining from them’ (Coombs 1981: 385). The more usual association of 
‘career’ with ‘respectable’ occupations, particularly the professions, is not lost on 
these researchers (Coombs 1981; Klingemann 1999).  
 
The authors of these studies of drug use as a career, target medical, psycho-social 
and criminal justice models of explanation of drug misuse and misusers. Focusing 
on the individual pathology of drug users, the authors of these latter types of study 
are criticised for tending to adjudge drug addicts as ill, socially maladjusted, 
hostile, immature, dependent, manipulative, or narcissistic (Rubington 1967; 
Feldman 1968; Coombs 1981: 369). The authors of such studies, moreover, are 
ridiculed for failing to move out of their own environments into that of the drug 
user in order to gather data within the context of the drug users’ wider socio-
economic environment (Feldman 1968; Coombs 1981). Sociological studies that 
take individual agency as their starting point, depicting the drug user as ‘retreatist’ 
or ‘weak-willed’ are likewise condemned (Preble and Casey 1967: 2), as is failure 
to acknowledge the relationship between social structural constraints and 
individual failure (Feldman 1968: 131; Bourgois 2002: 15). 
  
These criticisms serve to expand the discussion on respect between persons to 
consider how the social status, cultural norms and values, and resources available 
to different social actors, both professional researchers and members of a socially-
excluded group such as drug users, influence the way respect functions in their 
lives, and by extension in the research process. Becker (1967), for example, 
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suggests that by studying a situation such as illegal drug use from the perspective 
of the drug users, the law breakers, ‘we provoke the charge of bias, in ourselves 
and others, by refusing to give credence and deference to an established status 
order, in which knowledge of truth and the right to be heard are not equally 
distributed. … By refusing to accept the hierarchy of credibility, we express 
disrespect for the entire established order’ (pp. 241–242).  
 
2.3 Social Structures and Structural Constraints 
 
In his essay on deference and demeanour, Goffman (1967: 91) observes: ‘The 
environment must ensure that the individual will not pay too high a price for 
acting with good demeanour and that deference will be accorded him. Deference 
and demeanour practices must be institutionalised so that the individual will be 
able to project a viable, sacred self and stay in the game on a proper ritual basis’. 
In this section attention shifts from investigating the role of the individual in 
seeking and giving respect to focusing on the investigation of the influence of 
social structures and structural constraints on the functioning of respect in social 
interactions. 
 
Social Structures 
In the early 1980s, a Heroin Life Study (HLS) of untreated, inner-city Black male 
heroin users was conducted in ghettos in Chicago, New York, Washington DC 
and Philadelphia. A total of 124 men took part in open-ended, in-depth interviews 
conducted by former heroin addicts trained in interviewing (Hanson, Beschner, 
Walters and Bovelle 1985). The purpose was to gain a better understanding of 
these respondents through questions such as, How did they typically spend their 
days? How did they perceive their own world and the social world around them? 
How and with whom did they socialise? From whom did they obtain money and 
win peer respect? Why did they start using heroin and how much did they use on a 
regular basis? How did shooting heroin and being ‘high’ actually make them feel? 
Why did they continue to use? How did they remain treatment free? Different 
authors wrote different chapters of the report, analysing the interview transcripts 
from their own expert perspective.  
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In the following paragraphs I provide a summary of the findings of the HLS, 
highlighting the areas where the authors refer to the functioning of respect in the 
lives of the research subjects. I set this summary in the context of the work of 
Robert K. Merton on social structures, focusing on the concepts of status and role-
set, anomie and deviance, and conflict, which point to the kinds of social 
mechanisms that may facilitate the functioning of respect, and disrespect, in social 
life.  
 
Merton (1957) proposes two interdependent social mechanisms – ‘status-sets’ and 
‘role-sets’ – as a means of understanding how an individual occupying a particular 
status can satisfy his expectations within the social structure while avoiding 
conflict that could frustrate the achievement of his expectations or ends. Status is 
understood as the position in a social system that a person occupies, and as a 
determinant of the recognition-respect that a person may expect.  A ‘status-set’ 
consists of all the statuses that a person may occupy, for example physician, 
husband, father, professor, and Conservative party member. In relation to each 
status that a person occupies, he plays a series of roles, a ‘role-set’, for example 
the medical student will act out the role of student vis-à-vis teachers, other 
students, physicians, nurses, social workers, medical technicians and so on. The 
challenge for the occupier of a status and its accompanying role-set is to reduce 
the potential for disturbance in his role-set, to manage the expectations of the 
others, who may have differing expectations. The expectations of these others will 
be influenced by their own expectations as occupants of other statuses, which may 
be located in different and competing positions in the social structure.  
 
Merton identifies six mechanisms that articulate the functioning of role-sets, some 
of which involve the functioning of respect.9 It is the sixth mechanism, ‘abridging 
                                                        
9 The six mechanisms outlined by Merton (1938) include: (1) Relative importance of various 
statuses occurs when different members of the role-set place different priority on the performance 
of the status occupant, thus mitigating the extent of interference in the achievement of ends. These 
people may be said to respect the status of the status occupant. (2) Differences of power of those in 
the role-set occurs when some members of the role-set may have more power than others, and 
coalitions may form that reduce the distorting effect of the most powerful member. (3) Insulation 
of role-activities from observability by members of the role-set occurs when members trust, and 
respect, the status occupant sufficiently to allow him autonomy in carrying out his role. (4) 
Observability of conflicting demands between members of a role-set is loosely connected with the 
first mechanism. Merton suggests that when such conflict surfaces, it is incumbent on the members 
of the role-set, rather than the status occupant, to resolve the differences. (5) Mutual support 
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the role-set’, whereby the status occupant breaks off ties with members of his 
role-set, that appears to have been chosen by the research subjects interviewed as 
part of the Heroin Life Study (HLS). Merton suggests that this response is 
generally unusual, only possible under special and limited conditions, such as 
when the status-occupant can carry on his roles without the support of those in the 
role-set. The research subjects in the HLS appear to have chose this option as a 
means of reducing exposure to disrespect from members of their role-set  
 
Shifting his attention from the individual in the social structure to the influence of 
cultural values and norms, Merton (1938) analyses how individuals’ responses to 
and implementation of two elements of cultural structure – (1) goals, purposes and 
interests, and (2) norms such as regulations, rooted in social mores or institutions, 
of allowable procedures for moving towards the culturally-defined objectives – 
determine how individuals become located within the social structure. These two 
variables function independently of one another but jointly influence the way in 
which society functions, and determine the extent to which a society may be 
anomic, or normless. The outcome has consequences for the functioning of 
respect in these social structures. Merton outlines three main possibilities: 
1. Strong cultural goals may be associated with clear, institutionally-prescribed 
norms for achieving them. This results in social equilibrium, and integrated, 
and relatively stable, though changing, societies, in which satisfactions accrue 
to all actors through the realisation of goals reached through institutionally-
determined means of attaining them. Mutual respect may be expected to 
flourish in these conditions of social equilibrium: ‘The distribution of statuses 
through competition must be so organized that positive incentives for 
adherence status obligations are provided for every position within the 
distributive order’ (p. 134; italics in original).  
2. Institutionally prescribed norms and conduct may become an end in 
themselves, without reference to any cultural goals. As a result, ritual prevails, 
                                                                                                                                                        
among status occupants refers to the formation of associations among members of the same social 
status in order to cope with the conflicting demands of those in the role-set of the status. By this 
means, isolated individuals may curb the pressures exerted on them, by reference to the normative 
support of their peers. Becker’s account (see Chapter 2.2) of how marijuana users become aligned 
with other marijuana users shows how these ‘insiders’ maintain respect among themselves. (6) 
Abridging the role-set occurs when the status occupant breaks off ties with the members of his 
role-set, thereby avoiding adverse experience such as shame or humiliation.  
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conformity, and intolerance, become central values and the scope for 
flexibility shrinks. The grounds for respect between persons in such an 
environment may be expected to become correspondingly narrow and rigid, 
resulting in a premium being placed on ‘respectability’ and a corresponding 
tendency to condemn those who break the rules as being unworthy of respect  
3. Strong cultural goals may not be accompanied by serious concern over the 
means for achieving them. This may lead individuals to centre their emotional 
convictions on the complex of culturally-acclaimed ends, with far less 
emotional support for prescribed methods of reaching those ends. In such 
social circumstances, it may be expected that individuals will seek respect by 
reference to achievement of the cultural goals, and where they fail, they will 
seek respect by reference to smaller groupings of other individuals who have 
similarly failed. 
 
Merton identifies contemporary (late 1930s) American culture as approximating 
to the third type. He identifies money as an important symbol of success in 
American culture, suggesting that, ‘The anonymity of an urban society, in 
conjunction with these peculiarities of money, permits wealth, the sources of 
which may be unknown to the community in which the plutocrat lives, or, if 
known, to become purified in the course of time, to serve as a symbol of high 
status. … Prestigeful representatives of the society reinforce the cultural 
emphasis’ (p. 136). Focusing on this third possibility, Merton explores how 
individuals living in this cultural context respond. His analysis of five possible 
adaptations – conformism, innovation, ritualism, retreatism, or rebellion – is 
useful in understanding the lives of inner-city Black male heroin users living in 
ghettos in Chicago, New York, Washington DC and Philadelphia in the early 
1980s, and in particular, how they maintain respect. 
 
In the Heroin Life Study (HLS), the concept of respect figures in the research 
subjects’ accounts of their drug-using careers – taking care of business (the 
routine of the heroin user), hustling  (supporting a heroin habit), and the 
experience of living with heroin. One author sums it up: ‘In an impoverished 
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world with little to look forward to, these men have heroin to organize their 
mundane lives and reward them for another day survived. Lives measured not by 
stages or five-year plans. Lives where men find some small measure of justly felt 
pride and self-respect in their stamina and skills to make one-day plans, to arrange 
one-day lives’ (Hanson et al. 1985: 48).  
 
The HLS interview schedule contained open-ended questions designed to elicit 
how the respondents felt about themselves, their lives, and the straight (non-
heroin-using) world around them.10 Analysis of the responses revealed that while 
the men express regrets about their dependency, and admit a desire to stop or 
reduce it, they also maintain ‘a sense of self-respect’, which the author 
characterises as follows, ‘Many have great expectations for themselves. Although 
they feel frustrated at their lack of success in meeting these expectations, they still 
feel they have control over their lives. Some achieve a sense of mastery over their 
lives, …’ (p. 135) The men are perceived to occupy, by preference, a space 
between the straight world and the world of the street: ‘… the HLS men’s 
involvement with heroin is not a simple choice of whether or not to use a drug. 
It’s a choice between lifestyles, that of the street or that of the straight world. Both 
worlds seem to offer attractive rewards, as well as threats and complications … 
[which] are about equal in both worlds. Hence, these men seem partially 
committed to and partially repelled by their involvement in each of the two 
worlds’ (p. 150). In pursuit of their chosen life, these men are depicted as both 
having goals and exercising control. They have two ‘normative goals’, one to 
survive flirting with the dangers and experiencing the thrill of heroin use and/or 
life on the street, and one to realise dreams such as home, family, education and 
employment (p. 150). Control of their lives is maintained through managing their 
habit rather than letting it rule them; taking care of their personal appearance so 
that they do not appear down-and-out junkies; and avoiding treatment, where they 
would feel they had lost their freedom of action, sense of personal responsibility 
and self-esteem (Hanson et al. 1985: 178–9).  
 
                                                        
10 Questions included: What degree of control do you think you have over the events in your life? 
What changes, if any, in your feelings about yourself have occurred since you began using heroin? 
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Steering a course between the straight world and life on the street, the men live a 
life characterised by conflict and ambiguity. As well as seeking to maintain self-
respect, the study describes the men’s need to preserve their self-esteem and self-
identity in this unstable environment.11  They take up heroin use out of curiosity, 
to enhance their status among their peer group, to escape the pressures of their 
world, and to achieve ‘normalcy’ through an increased sense of well-being and 
competency; through heroin use they acquire companionship, self-strength and 
relief from personal distress – ‘experiences which might be considered very basic 
to self-esteem’  (Hanson et al. 1985: 142). The men use a distinctive argot, or 
specialised in-group language, with its own terms, phrases, metaphors, 
constructions and speech patterns: the author sees this not so much as an act of 
exclusion of, and hostility towards, outsiders (although this may be an ancillary 
function) as an opportunity to label shared experiences, to provide information 
and establish status within the community, and to promote a sense of identity in a 
community stigmatised by society: ‘it is a bonding, self-defensive and protective 
device’ (Hanson et al. 1985: 132).  
 
To return to Merton, the HLS account of how the research respondents have 
located themselves in the urban American social structure, suggests a location 
straddling two of Merton’s categories – retreatism and innovation. On the one 
hand, they have assimilated the cultural goals and institutional practices of society 
but, recognising that they will not achieve wealth-based social status in the 
straight world, they have retreated into a world of their own making, half-way 
between the straight world and the street world. The abridgement of their role-set, 
avoiding professional help for their drug addiction, in order to avoid 
stigmatisation, also suggests retreat. However, they have also displayed ingenuity, 
and innovation, in rejecting the straight world’s normative expectation that they 
should cease heroin use in order to succeed in life. Merton points out  that the 
retreatist option entails loss of respect by the wider society, while the innovator 
option carries the possibility of sneaking respect, and this appears to reflect the 
                                                                                                                                                        
How would you say straight society in general views heroin addicts? Think about straight people 
you actually know – even your own family. How do they regard you and your use of heroin? 
11 The authors also make reference to the concept of ‘self-esteem’. I assume that they make a 
similar distinction between self-respect and self-esteem as that outlined in Chapter 1.2. 
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position the research subjects find themselves in, certainly vis-à-vis the 
researchers:  
In public and ceremonial society, this type of deviant behaviour [retreatism] is 
most heartily condemned by conventional representatives of the society. … in 
contrast to the innovator who is at least ‘smart’ and actively striving, he 
sees no value in the success-goal which the culture prizes so highly. 
(Merton 1938: 149) 
 
Merton’s analysis of anomie and social structure may be applied to several of the 
research studies discussed elsewhere in this dissertation. For example, the 
‘outsiders’ analysed by Becker (1963) and the crack dealers of East Harlem in 
New York City (Bourgois 2003), both discussed in this chapter, may be viewed as 
‘retreatist’. Thye find respect among their own kind. Terry Williams’ (1991) 
‘cocaine kids’, who are heavily involved in drug dealing but who see it as a 
stepping-stone to getting ahead in the straight world (see Chapter 4.), may be 
viewed as innovators, who are planning to become conformists.  
 
In concluding, the authors of the HLS use the research subjects’ experience of 
undergoing treatment to cease heroin use to highlight the importance of respect in 
the lives of the men:  
HLS men gain a sense of self by participating in the heroin lifestyle, and enjoy a 
certain kind of respect in the ghetto community; they lose this when they abandon 
heroin for the treatment setting: … In short, heroin provides users with an 
organizing principle for everyday life and offers the rewards of feeling normal. 
… How can the treatment system compete with the perceived benefits of the 
heroin lifestyle? Can it offer these men a heroin-free lifestyle with dignity, 
feelings of self-worth, a sense of purpose? What kind of intervention will – as the 
heroin lifestyle often does – provide structure for daily activities, a reason to get 
up in the morning, goals to pursue, an opportunity for status and peer respect? 
(Hanson et al. 1985: 164, 169–70). 
  
This final plea for the drug users to be allowed some respect may be taken at face 
value, as a call for the research subjects to be treated with dignity based on 
recognising them as rational actors. The authors note that the research subjects 
are, from their own perspective, ‘adapting quite rationally to their reality’ (Hanson 
et al. 1985: 170). The statement, however, also raises questions about the conduct 
of the treatment providers. What do they do that results in the heroin users losing 
their sense of self-respect? How do they humiliate or stigmatise them, and is it 
intentional? As mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, the exploration 
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of the functioning of respect between social collectivities, such as drug users and 
treatment providers, is beyond the scope of this inquiry. However, this passage 
indicates the importance of pursuing this line of inquiry in order to gain a full and 
rounded understanding of the functioning of respect in everyday social life.12  
 
Structural Constraints 
Sennett (2003: Part 2) identifies three ways in which institutions in modern 
welfare societies shape character so that people earn, or fail to arouse, respect. 
Firstly, society applauds self-development, whereby a person develops their own 
abilities and skills, because society places a premium on efficient use of resources. 
Secondly, society values the independent, self-sufficient person, who can take 
care of himself, without drawing on the resources of the wider community. 
Thirdly, society appreciates the person who gives something back to the 
community. Sennett argues that in promoting these qualities as being worthy of 
respect, modern Western societies have created a means of morally justifying 
unequal treatment for those who cannot contribute to the conserving of public 
resources: in Goffman’s terms, such people are not able to ‘stay in the game’. 
Moody Adams  (1992–93: 276) comments how the excluded individuals may 
collude in their own exclusion from the game: ‘Some who are affected by such a 
scheme may also fail to discover alternative constructive means to affirm their 
                                                        
12 Lewis Coser (1956) provides a framework for the systematic analysis of the functions of 
conflict in societies, which might provide a useful starting place for an inquiry into the functioning 
of respect at the level of social collectivities. He argues that not only is conflict inevitable in 
societies, as individuals compete for scare resources, prestige or power positions, but that it is also 
desirable as it may contribute to the maintenance, adjustment or adaptation of social relationships 
and social structures.  
He identifies the conditions under which conflicts occur within societies, and those which 
may be expected to result in positive outcomes and in negative outcomes, and the conditions under 
which societies suppress conflicts, and the way in which these societies use a variety of 
mechanisms to vent their hostilities. His account suggests how respect may flourish in conditions 
of healthy conflict within a society, where different groups have the opportunity to express their 
differences and find an acceptable solution, but how it may also be a casualty of the process of 
conflict suppression, where mechanisms such as scape-goating may be used to deflect debate, for 
example using illegal drug-users as scape-goats to avoid confronting the legal and moral issues 
surrounding the very illegality of the drugs.  
In discussing the nature of conflicts between societies and ‘out-groups’, Coser highlights 
the mechanisms of war and the search for ‘enemies’, the discovery of whom can help to strengthen 
social cohesion, particularly in societies where opportunities for conflict and debate are inhibited. 
In light of President Nixon’s declaration of the ‘war on drugs’ in the 1970s (this ‘war’ still 
continues), it would be interesting to apply Coser’s model and again to see how respect may 
become a casualty in the course of such processes. 
 
40 
worth, and they may not recognize the destructive cultural fictions as fictions. For 
such people, social exclusion is almost certain to weaken self-respect.’ 
 
An ethnographic study of the lives of members of a marginalised group in New 
York City, who deal in and are dependent on crack cocaine, highlights how 
structural inequalities result in these research subjects feeling a lack of respect and 
how they manage to maintain their self-respect by reducing their exposure to this 
social environment. 
 
Between 1985 and 1990 anthropologist Philippe Bourgois lived in the 
predominantly Puerto Rican-inhabited East Harlem (El Barrio) in New York City. 
He had an interest in the political economy of inner-city street culture, and 
initially intended to write a book based on participant observation of the 
experience of poverty and ethnic segregation, but within a year of his arrival most 
of his friends, neighbours and acquaintances had been swept into ‘the 
multibillion-dollar crack cyclone’ (p. 1). Notwithstanding, his book is not about 
crack, or drugs, per se: ‘ … the two dozen street dealers and their families that I 
befriended were not interested in talking primarily about drugs. On the contrary, 
they wanted me to learn all about their daily struggles for subsistence and dignity 
at the poverty line’ (p. 2). The resulting book, first published in 1996, is entitled 
In Search of Respect: Selling Crack in El Barrio (2003).  
 
The ethnography elaborates on what Bourgois calls ‘inner-city street culture: a 
complex and conflictual web of beliefs, symbols, modes of interaction, values, 
and ideologies that have emerged in opposition to mainstream society. Street 
culture offers an alternative forum for autonomous personal dignity’ (Bourgois 
2002: 8). Bourgois suggests that, in the US, street culture has arisen as a means of 
resistance to racism and economic marginalisation, and has taken the form not so 
much of political opposition as an ‘oppositional style’. In a discussion on the 
relationship between structure and agency, one respondent, Primo, emphasises his 
own personal responsibility: ‘You have to do good for yourself in order to 
achieve, and you have to achieve in life in order to get somewhere. If you lay 
back, it’s ’cause you want to lay back, and then you want to cry out for help later. 
41 
The struggle’s harder for the poor, but not impossible; just harder. When you’re 
poor, you gotta have faith and respect in your own self’ (Bourgois 2002: 54). 
 
The respondents’ experiences and perceptions of work exemplify the complex and 
conflictual nature of the inner-city environment in which they live and the means 
of finding and maintaining respect within it. Benzie, a one-time crack dealer, who 
limits his bingeing on alcohol and cocaine-cum-heroin to the weekends and who 
is working in a low-paid job, emphasises that the best way to survive is to make 
money legally: ‘But now I am finally getting mine – my capacidad [self-worth] – 
I’ve finally got to that stage that I won’t do something. [pointing again to the 
cocaine] … I don’t want someone to respect me. I want to respect myself. I 
respect myself, man. [jabbing both forefingers into his chest] I changed. I’m a 
different person. I love myself. … I’m proud of myself’ (Bourgois 2002: 96–97; 
square brackets in original).  
 
However, owing to structural inequalities and their lack of the appropriate cultural 
capital, the Puerto Rican subjects in Bourgois’ study find it difficult to secure 
occupations in the legal economy. Ray, owner of the crack house in which 
Bourgois spends a lot of his time, tries and fails to establish viable, legal business 
ventures. ‘He mobilized violence, coercion, and friendship in a delicate balance 
that earned him consistent profits and guaranteed him a badge of respect on the 
street. In contrast, in his forays into the legal economy, Ray’s same street skills 
made him appear to be an incompetent, gruff, illiterate, urban jibaro’ (Bourgois 
2002: 135).  
 
Other respondents can only obtain low-paid menial jobs that are incompatible 
with their cultural mores and expectation; they are ineligible for higher-paid jobs. 
As a consequence, ‘they find themselves propelled headlong into an explosive 
confrontation between their sense of cultural dignity versus the humiliating 
interpersonal subordination of service work’ (Bourgois 2002: 141). The result 
generally is to return to crack-dealing. Some, such as Caesar, celebrate the street-
defined dignity of refusing to work honestly for low wages, wearing crack-dealing 
and unemployment as a ‘badge of pride’: ‘We is real vermin lunatics that sell 
drugs. We don’t wanna be part of society. … What do we wanna be working for? 
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We came here to this country, and we abused the freedom, because Puerto Ricans 
don’t like to work. … Okay, maybe not all of us, ’cause there’s still a lot of strict 
folks from the old school that still be working. But the new generation, no way! 
We have no regard for nothing. The new generation has no regard for the public 
bullshit. We wanna make easy money, and that’s it’ (Bourgois 2002: 131). 
 
Approaching the issue of structural inequalities from a black feminist perspective, 
Zerai and Banks (2002) conducted research into how, between 1985 and 2001, the 
media, researchers and policy makers constructed the ‘problem’ of Black-
American crack-addicted young mothers. While acknowledging that every 
individual must take some responsibility for initiating their own drug use, the 
authors argue that the prevailing discourses around these women and the 
structural limitations on their capacity to seek treatment and appropriate prenatal 
care, have contributed significantly to creating the problem. They call for a 
solution based on principles of social justice: 
Wider principles of human dignity must be applied to women in struggling with 
the disease of addiction. We argue that current anti-drug laws and policies strip 
women of dignity. The best avenue to change is not demonizing women addicted 
to cocaine. We seek policies that restore self-respect and preserves women’s 
ability to advance the health of their unborn children. (p. 12)  
 
Among the authors’ recommendations to encourage ‘a better way of thinking 
about maternal drug use (p. 143)’ are a call for researchers to avoid relying upon 
the prevailing racist, sexist and classist discourse, which can only guide ‘skewed 
research’, and negative sanctions for health practitioners who deter women from 
seeking prenatal care by their ‘judgemental, attitudes, stigmatising comments, and 
demeaning behaviour’.  
 
The authors discussed in this sub-section describe structural constraints from the 
point of view of either those in positions of power, those who impose the 
constraints, or those in positions of powerlessness, who may evade, resist or be 
complicit in perpetuating the constraints. They all make reference to the role of 
respect as an indicator of individuals’ access to power and control in their lives, 
and Zerai and Banks (2002) provide a useful analysis of the way in which the 
dominant discourse, constructed by those in authority, can affect the way respect 
is either bestowed or denied. While providing valuable insights, none of these 
43 
studies, however, provides an account that fully reveals how respect functions in 
such social situations: lacking is an account of the interactions that would serve to 
reveal how the subject and object involved either give or with-hold respect from 
each other. 
 
Van Dijk (1993), in outlining the principles of ‘critical discourse analysis’,13 
suggests how such an account may be accessed by means of investigating ‘social 
cognition’. He argues that dominant discourses are ‘jointly produced’ by those in 
authority and those who do not possess power or control, and that there is a need 
to bridge the gap between ‘macro-notions such as group or institutional power and 
dominance’, and ‘micro-notions such as text, talk or communicative interaction’:  
… in order to relate discourse and society, and hence discourse and the 
reproduction of dominance and inequality, we need to examine in detail the role 
of social representations in the minds of social actors. More specifically, we hope 
to show that social cognition is the necessary theoretical (and empirical) 
‘interface’, if not the ‘missing link’, between discourse and dominance. (Van 
Dijk 1993: 301) 
 
Arguably, this approach to critical discourse analysis, by examining properties of 
the context (e.g. access, setting and participants) and of the text (e.g. topics, 
meanings, style and rhetoric), will reveal, inter alia, how each actor in an 
interaction perceives and understand the functioning of respect, in relation both to 
himself and to the wider social environment. 
 
2.4 Concluding Remarks 
  
The research subjects described in this chapter, drug users, all reveal evidence of 
seeking respect. One author quoted in the Dublin magazine Brass Munkie (2000) 
describes the value he assigns to being shown respect by treatment service 
providers. A large proportion of the research subjects, however, describe the 
experience of being denied respect and the steps they took to gain acceptance by 
                                                        
13 Critical discourse analysis focuses on ‘the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge 
of dominance. Dominance is defined here as the exercise of social power by elites, institutions or 
groups, that results in social inequality, including political, cultural, class, ethnic, racial and gender 
inequality. This reproduction process may involve such different ‘modes’ of discourse – power 
relations as the more or less direct or overt support, enactment, representation, legitimation, denial, 
mitigation or concealment of dominance, among others’ (Van Dijk 1993: 300; italics in original). 
Critical discourse analysis should not be confused with the ‘discourse analysis’ discussed in 
Chapter 4.1. 
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other means. Becker (1963), Blumer (1967) and Bourgois (2003) all give 
examples of research subjects seeking and gaining respect among their peers in 
the drug world. Hanson et al. (1985) describe the tactics adopted by their research 
subjects to avoid exposure to stigmatisation.  
 
The studies do not generally yield insights into how the research subjects 
themselves give respect to others – to whom, why or how. This may be a function 
of the design of the research studies, which focus mainly on exploring the 
research subjects’ experiences of disadvantage and exclusion. Blumer (1967) 
describes the process whereby his research team successfully sought the trust and 
respect of the research subjects. In other studies, focusing on the ‘careers’ of drug-
users (see Chapter 3.1), it appears to follow from drug users’ assertions that they 
enjoy being respected by their peers in the drug world, that drug users are capable 
of giving, and do give, respect to others.  
 
Although the research studies do not generally take establishment figures, such as 
medical personnel, social researchers, the media or agents of the law, as their 
research subjects, they do reveal something of the ways in which such figures give 
or deny respect, and seek it for themselves. Hanson et al. (1985) and Bourgois 
(2002) describe the responses of drug users to displays of disrespect by members 
of the establishment, and Becker (1963) discusses how rule enforcers seek respect 
both from the wider society and also from rule breakers.  A number of researchers 
have been cited who allude to the ways in which researchers’ approaches to the 
topic of illegal drug use show a lack recognition and respect for the research 
subjects.  
 
Regarding analysis of the functioning of respect in everyday social life, 
Goffman’s model of face-to-face interaction, in particular his account of deference 
and demeanour rituals, serves well to reveal how different actors give or deny, 
and obtain, respect. His model provides a potential template for ensuring a 
balanced investigation, in which the respecting activities, or lack of respecting 
activities, of all players may be considered equally, and for highlighting 
symmetries or asymmetries. The notion of ‘social equilibrium’, mentioned in 
discussing the work of Merton, highlights the need for a broader analytical 
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framework not accessible through observing interactions. ‘Social mechanisms’, 
which serve to explain how people secure their positions, or status, in society and 
their relations with one another, help to understand the nature of interactions 
involving respect. Van Dijk’s (1993) critical discourse analysis offers an 
alternative approach to understanding the influence of social structures, or ‘power 
and dominance’, on the functioning of respect and self-respect, through analysing 
the structures, strategies and other properties of text, talk, verbal interaction and 
communicative events and the ways they contribute to the reproduction of social 
dominance. 
 
The phenomenon of ‘false’ or ‘hypocritical’ respect was mentioned in Chapter 1, 
and in Chapter 2.1 it was noted that Goffman also mentions the possibility of its 
occurrence. In considering the sociological significance of whether a display of 
respect is genuine or false, the primary issue for the social researcher is the 
question of its functionality. What purpose does a display of respect serve for the 
person who gives and for the person who receives it? Who benefits from such a 
display, and how do they benefit?  Who is disadvantaged and how? Who is aware 
of the falseness of a display and what effect does this have on them? Who is not 
aware and what effect does this have on their subsequent experiences? Arguably, 
only after these types of questions have been addressed, should the significance of 
the genuineness or otherwise of a show of respect be considered. 
 
Throughout this chapter, a number of claims regarding negative respecting 
behaviours, including perceived failures to show respect, perceived lack of 
respect, stigmatisation and humiliation, have been made, especially concerning 
members of the establishment, for example law enforcement agents, medical 
professionals and social researchers working in the area of illegal drugs. In 
considering such assertions, the researcher should make sure to ask, how do the 
perceptions and cognitive processes of the subject giving respect, and the object 
receiving the display of respect, influence their interpretation of the event? For 
example, in Chapter 1.1 the epistemological distinction between recognition-
respect (based on respect for the person’s dignity, either as a human-being or a 
holder of some office or position in society) and appraisal-respect (based on 
respect for a person’s character) was noted.  In considering the genuineness of an 
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instance of respect or an alleged display of negative respect, especially when its 
integrity is challenged by one of the social actors, the researcher needs to ask 
whether the different interpretations may be attributable to different 
epistemological positions regarding the grounds for respect, e.g. when a social 
actor shows recognition-respect for another person, that other person may be 
seeking appraisal-respect and may not only be disappointed by its absence but 
also believe that the other person has displayed a negative form of respect. 
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Chapter 3: Self-Respect –  
Getting a Life and Making Choices 
 
 
3.0      Introduction 
 
Self-respect is a person’s sense of self-worth. It is a much more private process 
than respect, not often articulated, particularly when a person’s feeling of self-
respect is assured. It may, however, be inferred from public demonstrations, such 
as when a person makes a decision consistent with his values and beliefs, takes 
steps to gain control of his life, wins status, prestige and recognition from others, 
commits to some pursuit whose accomplishment gives a sense of pride, or 
performs some act indicating respect for another.  
 
Social research into drug users, which reveals evidence of the functioning of self-
respect, is considered in this chapter. Studies of drug-users’ careers, and then the 
rational processes that people use to make choices and to avoid risk, are explored 
for evidence of the functioning of self-respect and as possible means of accessing 
the ways in which people manage their self-respect.  
 
3.1 Career Framework 
 
An early proponent of the application of the concept of ‘career’ to the lives of 
‘deviant’ people defines it as ‘the sequence of movements from one position to 
another in an occupational system made by any individual who works in that 
system’ (Becker 1963: 24). Rubington (1967) describes the drug user’s career 
thus: 
To become and be a drug addict, a person quite literally has to work at it. This 
work is not at all easy and in time entails decreasing rewards in proportion to 
decreased efforts. Nevertheless, an addict must make adjustments to institutions, 
formal organizations, informal relations, and must follow a sequence of roles in 
confirming and sustaining his identity as drug addict. Insofar as he does all that, 
he follows a career, albeit a deviant one rather than a legitimate one. (p. 4) 
 
Many studies of drug users, using the career framework, have been made. Studies 
of heroin users have revealed a series of career stages, starting with initiation, or 
experimental stage, and progressing through occasional, sporadic use, to regular, 
intermittent use, and finally, to regular, daily use (Crawford, Washington and 
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Senay 1983: 703). The stages observed by the researcher may vary according to 
the contingencies that the researcher isolates for closer inspection, which 
influence the individual’s choices and the resulting career path, for example the 
nature of initiation into heroin use, availability of and access to heroin, or reasons 
for limiting and/or ceasing to use (Becker 1963: Ch. 4; Crawford et al. 1983: 703; 
Faupel 1991: Ch. 2). Studies reveal that some will try heroin once and stop; some 
will use occasionally (chip) and then give up; some will go through periods of 
intense use in their teens and twenties and then grow out of the behaviour and the 
lifestyle; and some will have complex careers in heroin use, alternating between 
use and abstention, over a period as long as twenty or thirty years (Hunt 1997: 
284). Benefits attributed to using the career framework in studying users of illegal 
drugs are its neutral, judgement-free approach, and the opportunity it provides to 
study the relation between structure and agency (Goffman 1961: 119; Rubington 
1967: 3–4; Rosenbaum 1981: 128). 
 
These research studies did not set out to research the functioning of respect per se, 
but to study drug use careers in the context of broader social and cultural 
processes, such as gender, class, ethnicity, work and identity, economic status, 
and environmental factors. Moreover, people’s choices to commence or not 
commence, and to continue or discontinue, to use illegal drugs arise out of a 
highly complex mix of pharmacological, psychological and social causes (Becker 
1963: Ch. 3; Sussman and Ames 2000: Part 2). Nevertheless, the studies reveal, 
among other contingencies influencing the dug user’s decisions, the presence of a 
desire for respect from others and indicate how this translates into a sense of 
enhanced self-respect. The following subsections outline aspects of the drug 
users’ career that contribute to the enhancement of self-respect in their lives. 
  
Control  
Control of one’s life, the capacity to decide for oneself what one does, contributes 
to others having the opportunity to have appraisal-respect for one and to 
enhancing one’s own sense of self-respect. In a study of the careers of heroin 
users, based on in-depth qualitative interviews with 71 clients of substitution 
treatment programmes in the Dublin area in 1998, Dillon (2001) reports firstly 
how respondents describe how they tried heroin in order to escape from reality 
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and personal problems, to a space where nothing could get at them and other 
people’s attitudes didn’t affect them (Dillon 2001: 81–85). These reasons may be 
described as ‘retreatist’ (see Chapter 2.3 for a discussion of social structure and 
anomie, including retreatism), but alternatively they may be interpreted as 
indicating how the person has increased self-control and recognition self-respect 
through reducing the opportunities for others to diminish her and her sense of self-
worth.  
 
Several respondents in Dillon’s study engaged in their initial drug use after 
leaving school early and finding themselves unemployed. Growing up in an 
environment characterised by economic deprivation, these young people sought 
out ‘something to fill in their time and alleviate the boredom – in these cases drug 
use’ (Dillon 2001: 61). The significance of drug use in filling time, in providing 
‘meaningful structures’ and ‘normative clarity’, is mentioned by other authors 
(Pearson 1987: 87–89; Faupel 1991: 44). A ‘street junkie’ interviewed by Faupel 
(1991) describes how important it is to have some occupation to fill the time: 
‘Usually the person that gets involved in drugs is not totally involved in anything 
else. I was on the street at the time [I started using more]. I just got laid off. … 
This made me susceptible to the street. … A man would become involved in 
anything – negative or positive – as long as he’s involved. You must have some 
activity. Drugs is a commitment’ (Faupel 1991: 119). This form of control, over 
how one spends one’s time, may be understood to contribute to a sense of 
recognition (autonomy) self-respect. 
 
The ability to control one’s drug use – how one administers drugs, what drugs one 
uses, the extent of one’s dependency – is an important source of self-respect. The 
transition from smoking to injecting heroin is perceived negatively, with injecting 
confirming one’s status as a stereotypical junkie. Two of Dillon’s respondents, 
both of whom injected, describe their feelings about the transition. The first 
expresses shame:  ‘It was kind of like em, well I was disgusted, now really I was, 
you know. I never thought I would do it’ (Dillon 2001: 108). The second reveals a 
lack of evaluative self-respect: 'Like I started off smoking, you know, but like 
when I thought about drugs I thought about syringes and all that. … So, especially 
when I kept on all I just wanted was a syringe to use drugs, that’s the way I 
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thought, that’s the way I really thought about it. I mean all and all I have been 
abusing me body you know I don’t bleeding care, really I couldn’t care whether I 
died tomorrow or anything, that’s the way I feel, and I still feel that way, I 
couldn’t give a shit what happens to me’ (Dillon 2001: 109).  
 
Evaluative self-respect also derives from avoiding use of heroin altogether, or at 
least controlling one’s use so that one is not forced into unethical behaviours such 
as robbing from one’s family or friends. ‘I just thought it [heroin] was a real 
knacker’s drug, you know what I mean? Scumbags, you know. I didn’t, I wasn’t 
into it at all, E’s [ecstasy] were kind of socially acceptable, you know, but heroin 
was just a different kind of thing’ (Dillon 2001: 106); ‘So I’m a junkie now. But 
I’m not one of those scrub junkies, where I got to steal from my family. …I’m 
dealing. And I’m paying for my habit thataway’ (Faupel 1991: 107). 
 
Status and Prestige  
Status refers to a person’s position in a social structure, and prestige to material or 
reputational evidence reflecting a person’s status. They provide a basis for 
demanding recognition (institutional-)respect from others and contribute to a 
sense of recognition self-respect. In seeking to explain ‘drug epidemics’ among 
young males in slum environments in North American cities, Feldman (1968) 
argues that the young drug user ‘must be able to define drug use as consistent with 
his understanding of how status and prestige are earned within his social network’ 
(p. 132). The status and prestige are typically conferred on action-seeking youths 
who become ‘stand-up cats’ through exciting, daring, tough and dangerous 
behaviour. Feldman describes how the ‘stand-up cats’ wrest institutional 
recognition-respect from others: 
Interest in drug use arises partly from a prospective stand-up cat’s disillusionment 
with his former heroes, who in the past seemed invincible. Now, after a period of 
drug use, they have declined in the young stand-up cat’s own status system. 
Instead of the hero going out and taking money like he used to, he may implore 
or ask in such a way that the younger boy begins to feel his mastery over 
someone whom he had previously respected and feared. The youth may even 
chance his strength against the addict by showing open disrespect or by actually 
fighting him with the result that the drug user gets stripped of his toughness. (p. 
135) 
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Young men may also take on heroin itself in an effort to win the respect of others: 
‘For the youth to become truly a stand-up cat he must fight more worthy 
opponents, championship material, whoever they may be. And since he has seen 
previous stand-up cats buckle to the strength of heroin, the lure it holds as a route 
to prestige and status among action-seeking peers is enhanced’ (p. 135). In short, 
using heroin is ‘one route to becoming “somebody” in the eyes of the important 
people who comprise the slum social network’ (p. 138). 
 
Within drug-using communities there is a clear hierarchy of actors, with attendant 
statuses that demand recognition (institutional-)respect. In detailing the different 
levels in a heroin distribution network in New York City, based on research into 
the lives and activities of lower-class heroin users in their street environment, 
Preble and Casey (1967) describe how the ‘dealer in weight’ stands midway 
between the top and bottom of the distribution chain and is the first one in the line 
to run the risk of being apprehended by law enforcement officers, as his identity is 
known to people in the street: ‘He is commonly referred to as one who is into 
something, and is respected as a big dealer who has put himself into jeopardy, …  
if he gets caught, he can expect a long jail sentence’ (Preble and Casey 1967: 10). 
In contrast, the ‘taste face’, the user who supports his habit by renting out his 
‘works’ (paraphernalia for injecting heroin), stands low in the hierarchy and is 
held in contempt by other users (Preble and Casey 1967: 14).  
 
Rosenbaum (1981), who conducted depth interviews using the life-history method 
with 100 women heroin addicts – 95 in San Francisco and 5 in New York City – 
argues that women follow a career path distinct from that of men and one 
characterised by a narrowing of options and greater stigmatisation.  In relation to 
status and prestige, she finds that while men relish taking on risky activities, 
including drug dealing, women tend to disdain the riskiness and not to participate 
in the business end of the heroin world. As a consequence, they tend to forgo the 
enhanced status and material wealth available to male heroin users and dealers.  
 
Skills and Expertise 
The acquisition of skills in a drug-using career is frequently referred to – skills in 
acquiring the wherewithal to buy drugs (usually criminal activities such as 
52 
shoplifting, pick-pocketing, burglary), buying drugs, and consuming drugs. 
Faupel (1991) describes the career phase in which drug use is ‘stable’ – regular 
but intermittent – as the most productive time in an addict’s career, the phase most 
analogous to the productive, established period in conventional careers, and one in 
which the user enjoys considerable status and prestige, recognition-respect, 
among his peers. With his criminal skills finely honed, the stable addict enjoys a 
level of prestige not shared by ‘the more flat-footed hustlers, who are viewed as 
unskilled opportunists’, an income capable of supporting a conspicuous level of 
consumption, and a highly developed routine which served to structure his daily 
activities. This ‘stable addict’ also has the capacity to act ethically in relation to 
his peers and colleagues, to ‘maintain ethical respectability in the subculture’ 
(Faupel 1991: 94–95). 
 
The very possession of skills is also a source of pride and evaluative self-respect. 
Dillon (2001: 145–148) cites a series of respondents who describe maintaining 
their drug habit as a seven-days a week, 365-days a year, occupation.  This 
finding mirrors that of Preble and Casey (1967), who observe: ‘For them [the 
research subjects], the quest for heroin is the quest for a meaningful life, not an 
escape from life. And the meaning does not lie, primarily, in the effects of the 
drug on their minds and bodies; it lies in the gratification of accomplishing a 
series of challenging, exciting tasks, every day of the week’ (p. 3). The saying, A 
good craftswoman takes pride in her work, also resonates in the world of the 
heroin user. Dillon (2001) cites a heroin user’s appreciation of the ritual, the 
specialist knowledge and skills, needed to inject: ‘In me own opinion there was a 
ritual to it, using a needle. … I used to get me money worth of it like the whole 
ritual the whole thing like’ (p. 110). Conversely, another respondent prefers the 
procedures associated with smoking rather than injecting: ‘It’s kind of a ritual to 
me, and I love actually doing that. That’s the mental thing I love actually doing 
that. You’d get a good hour enjoyment out of actually taking it rather than 
someone who just puts it in their arm and just gets a few minutes’ (p. 107). 
 
Rosenbaum (1981: 95–100) finds that the women in her study are expected to 
carry out their maternal responsibilities alongside their heroin-related activities. If 
they are to succeed, the women need to exercise extraordinary discipline and 
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control, which in turn lead to a sense of personal pride, self-worth and the respect 
of others within the heroin-using community.  
 
Legal Paid Work 
Rosenbaum (1981) finds that work is an important determinant of the women’s 
identity and level of recognition self-respect. While they are in legal work, they 
do not consider themselves junkies. When they are no longer in regular 
employment and enter an illegal occupation, such as hustling or prostitution, they 
see themselves as first and foremost a junkie who has had to become an outlaw in 
order to support their heroin habit. One woman wonders how non-addicted 
prostitutes can maintain their self-respect: ‘I don’t think I could dig being looked 
at like that. So, if I do sell my body, I want to be respected for it. I’m not out there 
doing it because I get off doing it but because I need the money’ (Rosenbaum 
1981: 82). In relation to changing her lifestyle and shedding her self-image of 
being a junkie, one woman describes the importance of getting legal work: ‘And 
the main thing is the feeling you have about yourself. If you start feeling a little 
proud about yourself, you have self-worth’ (Rosenbaum 1981: 85).  
 
Limitations of Career Framework 
While analysis of drug-users’ career paths reveals the presence of, and means of 
achieving, a sense of self-respect, it does not reveal the actual process whereby the 
decision to acquire, maintain or risk losing a sense of self-respect is made. For 
example, why would someone choose to gain control of their life by consuming a 
substance associated with serious health and socio-economic risks? If a person 
desires prestige and status, would it not be more rational to adopt a course of 
action that will lead to accessing more stable and secure sources of same? In 
Chapter 3.2 below the application of analytical methods focusing on choice-
making and risk-assessment are considered as a means of getting closer to the 
rational processes underpinning the functioning of self-respect. 
 
Within the corpus of studies into drug-using careers from a symbolic interactionist 
perspective, Biernacki (1986) did investigate the way in which his research 
subjects made choices about whether and how to give up drug use. His objective 
was to obtain ‘a substantive understanding of the natural course of addiction as it 
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might unfold to its termination’ (p. xii). His findings will be discussed below in 
Chapter 3.2. Noteworthy at this point, however, is his criticism of other users of 
the career framework as usually failing to acknowledge the variability of the 
experiences and career paths of individual drug users. He suggests that rather than 
following inevitable and uniform stages of deepening involvement with the 
addictive drug, different heroin users enjoy ‘different kinds of involvements with 
the world of addiction’ (p. 182). He outlines four variants of the drug-using 
career: (1) the stereotypical addict, who progresses through the stages outlined in 
this section; (2) others who appear to have been ‘passing through’ the world of 
addiction; (3) yet others who maintained an active involvement in the ordinary 
world, keeping their addiction under control so that it did not affect the rest of 
their life; and finally (4) those who had only a peripheral involvement in the world 
of addiction, through a relationship with someone more firmly anchored in it. 
Biernacki’s critique confirms the need for a more nuanced study of people’s 
choices and decisions. 
 
3.2 Making Choices and Accepting Risks  
  
Between 1984 and 1986, 150 clients at three London drug-treatment agencies 
were interviewed and asked, inter alia, to pick from a list of 54 items on a self-
completion questionnaire the important reasons for their seeking help. ‘Life out of 
control’ and ‘Realized has no self-respect’ were the two items most heavily 
endorsed by respondents as having occurred and as being important reasons for 
seeking help (Oppenheimer, Sheehan and Taylor 1988: 638).  
 
In theory, it is possible to explain this result by means of rational choice theory as 
applied to complex social phenomena. Based on ‘methodological individualism’, 
which sees the elementary unit of social life as the individual human action, 
rational choice theory argues that ‘the same general principles [as in economic 
rational choice theory] can be used to understand interactions in which such 
resources as time, information, approval and prestige are involved’ (Scott 2000: 
2). Thus, the research subjects who ticked the boxes ‘Life out of control’ and 
‘realized has no self-respect’, may be understood to have a preference for gaining 
control of their life and building their self-respect. They have information 
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indicating that their drug addiction is militating against this preferred state and 
they believe that getting treatment for their addiction is likely to lead to the 
achievement of this end. There are alternative means, such as going cold-turkey, 
bringing their drug use under control so that they can hold down a job, or 
obtaining sufficient funds to support their drug habit, for example by taking up 
drug dealing or trafficking, and thereby winning status, prestige and self-respect 
within the drug world. However, they perceive these alternatives as offering less 
possibility of achieving the preferred outcome, self-control and self-respect, and 
choose the alternative that they believe will maximise their utility. 
 
While plausible, this explanation depends on the assumptions that desiring control 
of one’s life and gaining self-respect are rational and that these states are not 
attainable while dependent on drugs. The latter assumption depends, in turn, on 
acceptance of a social norm, a norm widely shared in Western society and 
supported by legal sanctions, that drug addiction is bad for one, that it leads to, 
inter alia, loss of willpower, self-control and self-respect. There is considerable 
debate, however, as to whether preferences based on social norms are rational, as 
to whether they serve the individual’s self-interest. Rational choice theorists have 
countered this objection by arguing that norms are simply arbitrary preferences 
into which rational actors are socialised and that they act rationally in relation to 
these norms. Alternatively, co-operation with others in society, through adherence 
to shared social norms, is a desirable end result, is in the best interest of each 
individual and is therefore rational for each individual to want (Scott 2000: 6–7). 
However, entering drug treatment in order to co-operate with the wider society 
and abide by its shared norms about the negative aspects of drug use is not 
necessarily rational or in the best interest of the individual drug user. As shown in 
Chapter 3.1, drug users already enjoy a sense of self-respect within the drug world 
through having control of their lives, possessing skills and discipline to maintain 
their lifestyle and enjoying status and prestige among their peers. Faupel (1991: 
63), moreover, describes how some of his respondents enter treatment simply in 
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order to stabilise their drug use and regain the status of ‘stable addict’ as opposed 
to ‘street junkie’, with the ultimate aim of resuming drug use.14  
 
Jon Elster (1989a, 1989b) offers a solution to the difficulty concerning the relation 
between rationality and social norms that suggests a means of approaching the 
question of how individuals may make choices that include consideration of their 
sense of self-worth. Elster argues that individuals may choose a particular course 
of action based on rational choice or by reference to social norms, or by a 
combination of both approaches. Although rationality and social norms may be 
analysed within the one framework, Elster sees them as logically separate and 
distinct. Rationality is characterised by a concern with outcomes and the future, 
and unconnected with past experience, while social norms are not concerned with 
outcomes, focus on the present without regard to the future, and take past 
experience into account. Social norms may help to co-ordinate people’s 
expectations and may contribute to rational outcomes for society, contributing to 
the self-interest of everyone, but these outcomes are incidental: social norms have 
a motivating power that is independent of their use in optimisation. Having 
rejected a functionalist explanation of social norms, as leading to optimal 
outcomes for society, Elster proposes that the force of social norms arises from 
their peculiar link to the emotions: 
Social norms have a grip on the mind that is due to the strong emotions their 
violations can trigger. I believe that the emotive aspect of norms is a more 
fundamental feature than the more frequently cited cognitive aspects. If norms 
can coordinate expectations, it is only because the violation of norms is known to 
trigger strong negative emotions, in the violator himself and in other people. 
(Elster 1989a: 100; italics in original) 
 
A few pages further on, retaining the methodological individualism of rational 
choice theory, Elster suggests how social norms operate at the level of the 
individual: ‘A norm … is the propensity to feel shame and to anticipate sanctions 
by others at the thought of behaving in a certain forbidden way. … this propensity 
becomes a social norm when and to the extent that it is shared with other people’ 
(p. 105; italics in original).  
 
                                                        
14 Oppenheimer et al. (1988) do not indicate whether the respondents in their survey viewed their 
drug-treatment as leading to permanent abstinence or whether it was a short-term measure to 
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In categorising the emotions, Elster (1999: 21–22) distinguishes the ‘social 
emotions’ which ‘involve a positive or negative evaluation of one’s own or 
someone else’s behaviour or character’. Based on these three dichotomies 
(evaluation, character and behaviour), he identifies a total of eight social 
emotions, of which the four relating to character coincide with and expand the list 
of emotions noted in Chapter 1.3 as arising as a consequence of the functioning of 
respect:15 
 Shame: a negative emotion triggered by a belief about one’s own character 
 Pridefulness: a positive emotion triggered by a belief about one’s own 
character. 
 Contempt and hatred: negative emotions triggered by beliefs about another’s 
character. (Contempt is induced by the thought that another is inferior; hatred 
by the thought that she is evil.) 
 Liking: a positive emotion triggered by a belief about another’s character. 
 
Without delving further into the functioning of the emotions in relation either to 
the social norms or among themselves, it seems possible to suggest an explanation 
of the results in the survey described at the beginning of this section. Rather than 
reflecting a rational choice on the part of the respondents regarding entering drug 
treatment, the results reflect the shame felt by the respondents when presenting for 
treatment and having to publicly acknowledge that they have failed to conform to 
the social norm of having a sense of self-respect, through having become 
dependent on an illegal drug. The response does not necessarily reflect the 
respondents’ motivation for entering treatment so much as their feelings on being 
asked for reasons by the researchers.16  
                                                                                                                                                        
stabilise their drug use in a time of particular difficulty. 
15 The positive and negative emotions connected with behaviour, as opposed to character, are guilt 
or pride triggered by beliefs about one’s own actions, and anger or admiration triggered by beliefs 
about another’s actions. 
16 The results of a factor analysis of the responses to the questionnaire (Oppenheimer et al. 1988: 
639) would seem to bear out this interpretation, as the salience of ‘Realized has not respect’ 
dropped significantly. A cluster of factors associated with becoming dependent on drugs (need 
drugs every day, using opiates (heroin), chronic drug use) came first, followed by a cluster 
associated with difficulties in accessing drugs, and then a cluster associated with decreased ability 
to cope with emotional crises. ‘Realized has no self-respect’ was associated with the fourth-ranked 
cluster that had to do with threats to the respondents’ abilities to hold down a paid job. This 
analysis suggests that the respondents’ motivation for entering treatment was based on rational and 
instrumental grounds; loss of control and self-respect were reasons identified in order to display 
shame and imply a desire to adhere to the social norms in the future. 
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In a series of essays on risk and blame in modern industrial societies, Mary 
Douglas (1992) rejects the ‘methodological individualism’ of rational choice 
theory, in preference for a ‘cultural/symbolic’ approach,17 which provides an 
alternative approach to understanding how individuals make choices affecting 
their sense of self-respect. Douglas argues that risk perception is a political 
phenomenon whereby social institutions determine both what constitutes a risk 
and how to respond to risks, thereby legitimising their own existence. Individuals’ 
rationality is bounded, Douglas suggests, not by individuals’ own cognitive 
processes but by social institutions, ‘which blinker and focus the individual 
rational agent’ (Douglas 1992: 56).  
 
To elaborate, a society’s institutions create a ‘forensic vocabulary’ around risk, 
which leads to the construction of a moral community and legitimises the 
institutions. A system for assigning accountability and responsibility when 
disaster strikes, in other words ‘blaming’, serves to reinforce the community ideal: 
‘Blaming is a way of manning the gates through which all information has to pass. 
Blaming is a way of manning the gates and at the same time of arming the guard. 
News that is going to be accepted as true information has to be wearing a badge of 
loyalty to the particular political regime which the person supports; the rest is 
suspect, deliberately censored or unconsciously ignored’ (Douglas 1992: 19). 
Those who are blamed are imputed with moral failure and rejected by the social 
system. In competitive, individualist societies, moreover, Douglas argues there is 
an inevitable tendency for those who are already disadvantaged to carry a greater 
share of blame, to be deemed contaminated and stigmatised, and written off as 
human derelicts.  
 
In this risk framework, respect may be understood to act as a ‘hygiene’ factor, i.e. 
enabling society to function, to approve/accept some people and disapprove/reject 
                                                        
17 Lupton (1999: 1–11) identifies three major approaches to understanding risk in modern 
industrialised societies: the ‘cultural/symbolic’, as elaborated principally by Mary Douglas, 
focusing on risk as a means of maintaining cultural boundaries; the ‘risk society’ associated with 
the work of Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, which focuses on how macro-structural factors 
have led to an intensification of concern with risk in late modern societies; and the 
‘governmentality’ perspective of Michel Foucault, which emphasises the role of experts in 
constructing and mediating discourses on risk. 
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others. The possession of self-respect and receiving the respect of others 
legitimises a person’s membership of the moral community; those lacking self-
respect and the respect of others are perceived as a threat to the community ideal, 
and tend to be blamed, stigmatised and excluded. Respect also helps mediate the 
relationships between different cultural groups within the community. In addition, 
recognition- and appraisal-respect are arguably manifestations of what Douglas 
terms ‘fetish power’, the personal resources such as charisma, talent and success, 
which individuals in competitive, individualist societies draw on to become or 
remain leaders of society.  
 
The research project described at the beginning of this section was undertaken by 
members of the Addiction Research Unit of the Institute of Psychiatry in the 
United Kingdom. It seems reasonable to suggest that the respondents, 
approximately three quarters of whom were unemployed and regular opioid users, 
when presented with the list of possible reasons for attending treatment, chose 
‘Life out of control’ and ‘Realized has no self-respect’ in an attempt to redeem 
themselves in the eyes of these professional researchers. Aware of their 
stigmatisation and exclusion from mainstream society, the respondents may have 
seen such a response as indicating to these ‘respected’ members of the 
‘establishment’ that they did not pose a threat to society.  
 
At the end of Chapter 3.1 above, Biernacki’s (1986) in-depth study of heroin 
users, who exited heroin addiction without going through any form of treatment or 
other assistance, was mentioned as offering an analysis of the choices that his 
research subjects made at various stages in their drug-using careers.  Biernacki 
conducted in-depth interviews with 101 former heroin addicts, inviting them to 
tell their stories of overcoming their addiction; he was seeking information on 
what brought about their decision to stop using drugs.18 He identified three groups 
of decision-makers – those who just quit; those who made a rational decision to 
quit; and those who hit rock bottom or had an existential crisis. 
                                                        
18 General areas covered in the interview guide included: Life involvements, problems, extent of 
drug use, and self-conceptions prior to recovery; conditions that brought about idea to stop; actions 
taken to enact idea to stop; role that others played in giving rise to idea of stopping and the help 
they provided to realise the idea; various problems confronted and the ways they were handled; 
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Those who quit ‘without making any firm decision’ (Biernacki 1986: 44–49), just 
drifted away and became involved in other things. Self-respect would appear to 
have not been an issue for this group: their sense of self-worth seems to have been 
in tact. Among those who made ‘explicit, rational decisions to stop’ (pp. 49–56), 
some considered that there was more to be gained for themselves and for their 
futures by breaking the addiction than by continuing. Others believed the 
experience of ‘burn-out’, loss of excitement and enthusiasm for the demanding 
life of surviving as a drug user, was ‘not worth the candle’. External pressures and 
obstacles placed by society in the way of people pursuing an outlawed and 
despised occupation, including ‘general stigmatisation’, were also factors. It may 
be surmised that members of this group already enjoyed a sense of self-respect 
and that their decisions to cease drug use were partly to maintain their self-
respect.  
 
Biernacki describes the decision-making processes of the third group, those who 
had ‘hit rock bottom’ or encountered an ‘existential crisis’, as follows: 
Rock bottom is defined here as a subjective state; it is the point at which people 
reach the nadir of their lives and decide, with some emotion, that they must 
change. For example, they may experience deep humiliation as a result of being 
robbed or jailed, or they may feel socially rejected when they learn that 
significant others are now aware of their addiction. Drug use and the addict 
lifestyle may become intolerable, and a decision to change is made. 
Existential crisis can be distinguished from the rock-bottom phenomenon 
by the fact that  an existential crisis is a more profound emotional and 
psychological state. Addicts in the midst of an existential crisis come to question 
their whole life pattern and, within that pattern, their core identities as drug 
addicts. Most commonly, the experience is felt in terms of profound 
mortification, as a symbolic death of the self. … Because some addicts engage in 
contemptible behavior when trying to support their habit, they may feel scorned 
by others, they feel guilty and degraded. Recognizing the reasons for feeling as 
they do, they may try to salvage some vestige of their sense of self-worth by 
considering various social options to their quandary, but because of what they 
have done and what they believe others think about them, they may conclude that 
they have nowhere to turn. Unable to reclaim some positive sense of self-worth, 
they may turn to thoughts of suicide, or actual suicide attempts, as the only way 
to relive their suffering. (p. 57; italics added). 
 
It seems clear that the people in this group had lost most of, and some all, their 
self-respect, and had taken steps to regain some sense of self-worth. It is 
                                                                                                                                                        
and changes undergone in self-conception, lifestyle, and ideas about the future (Biernacki 1986: 
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interesting to note that the decision-making of this third group may be explained 
using Elster’s model of decision-making, based on a desire, driven by emotions, 
to adhere to social norms, while the rational decision-making of the second group 
may be explained by reference to Douglas’ model of risk avoidance and their 
desire to achieve membership of the preferred moral community.    
 
Later in his report, Biernacki (1986: 73–76) discusses research subjects’ reasons 
for not going into treatment. The possibility of being exposed to a lack of respect 
by the treatment services would appear to have been a factor in the choice made 
by a significant proportion. While 54 per cent stated that they had no need or did 
not believe treatment would help, 14 per cent stated that they ‘feared 
stigmatization (i.e., thought they would be officially recorded as addicts or as 
mentally ill) and 4 per cent ‘did not wish to be humiliated or degraded’. This 
response is similar to that found in the Heroin Life Study (Hanson et al. 1985), 
discussed in Chapter 2.3, where it was suggested that in refusing to enter 
treatment, the heroin users were ‘abridging their role-set’ as a means of avoiding 
stigmatisation and loss of self-respect. However, this explanation does not entirely 
account for the research subjects’ response: they chose to avoid stigmatisation and 
humiliation in order to avoid the unpleasant emotions experienced by entering 
into the treatment setting. 
 
In describing how some research subjects ‘stayed abstinent’, Biernacki (1986: 
129–137) describes a dual approach of ‘negative contexting’ of drug use and 
‘supplanting thoughts’ of drug use with alternative, preferable thoughts, in other 
words, the research subjects maintained their own sense of self-worth by 
denigrating their former occupation, and people who still engaged in it, as 
unhealthy, morally wrong or socially unacceptable. While Biernacki is not 
specifically concerned with the functioning of respect and self-respect among his 
research subjects, these mechanisms indicate how the giving or with-holding of 
respect can be employed to bolster one’s own self-respect. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Appendix B). 
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In the 1990s Paula Mayock (2001) undertook a qualitative study of 15–19-year-
olds in inner-city Dublin who were considered to be ‘high risk’ for problem drug 
use. Interviewing 57 young people on a one-to-one basis and holding focus groups 
with 24, to investigate their subjective experience of drug use and the social 
environment of drug use,19 and subjecting the resulting interview data to a 
grounded theory analysis, Mayock was interested in exploring ‘the role of choice 
and decision-making in drug use’.  Although Mayock did not research self-respect 
or respect specifically, her reported findings suggest insights into the functioning 
of self-respect in the lives of individual respondents. 
 
Mayock reports that ‘young people asserted their personal role in the decision to 
use drugs and invariably claimed ownership of their drug use’ (p. xvi).20 One 
research subject tells Mayock: ‘If I wanted to get drugs now I’d be able to go over 
and get them. Like, it’s that easy to get. It’s your decision like. If ya want ta take 
drugs, ya take drugs. If ya don’t want ta, ya don’t’ (p. 55). Blumer (1967), whose 
research on youthful drug users was discussed in Chapter 2.1, reports that his 
research subjects ‘were well anchored in their drug use and well fortified in their 
beliefs against all the dangers of drug use’ (p. ii). Their positions are based on 
their own experiences and observations and a set of collective beliefs that justified 
their drug use. ‘In sum, we learned that youthful drug users are just not interested 
in abstaining from drug use’ (p. ii). These findings indicate that these research 
populations of young drug users enjoy a sense of autonomy self-respect insofar as 
they make their own decisions.  
 
‘Socialisation’ is identified by Mayock as a critical factor in influencing both 
abstainers’ and users’ choices. The rationality of young people’s drug-related 
decisions was ‘strongly mediated’ by their experiences and their social 
                                                        
19 The interview schedule contained approximately 135 different items. Topics covered included 
the types of drugs used, the locations and individuals associated with drug use, respondents’ daily 
routines, their experience of school and leisure, and their interaction with adults and peers, their 
views regarding their own and others’ behaviours.  
20 This sense may have partly been a function of the interview situation: Mayock describes how in 
preparing for the interviews,  ‘a great deal of time was invested by the researcher in establishing a 
trusting relationship with prospective research participants’ (Mayock 2001: 17). The title of the 
research report – ‘Choosers or Losers?’ – indicates the interviewer’s attitude to decision-making 
around drugs and this may also have influenced respondents to adopt an assertive disposition in 
responding to questions. 
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interactions, but the findings indicate a well-developed sense of self-respect, 
based on a sense of personal control: 
It is clear from the evidence presented throughout this report that drug-taking has 
a perceived value and that the act of drug-taking is rarely pursued in the absence 
of tangible rewards. Individual drug users offered a range of explanations for 
drug use, ranging from curiosity to the alleviation of boredom and negative self-
thought. The benefits of drug use were closely linked to the social context of use: 
friends made the drug experience worthwhile, thus playing an important role in 
encouraging subsequent use. The research evidence suggests, however, that the 
pursuit of drug-related pleasure was highly unlikely to occur without the 
individual’s personal endorsement of the activity and his/her belief in its benefits. 
Although individual levels of drug involvement corresponded roughly to that of 
the peer group, there was ample evidence to indicate that users made personal 
decisions about the use and non-use of substances. While emphasising the shared 
nature of the experience, young people indicated their own personal limits, 
irrespective of the behaviour of their friends. (Mayock 2001: 81) 
 
Interviewing only young people from one inner-city area of Dublin, Mayock 
(2001: 20–21) noted the isolation of the research subjects from wider Irish society 
and its norms. She reported that while they were critical of the level of drugs, 
violence and crime in their community, they were equally conscious of their own 
marginality in wider society, which, in their view, was exacerbated by negative 
and offensive outside representation of their community. They also rarely 
mentioned the legal risks associated with drug use: they ‘did not appear to worry 
about the legal consequences of being found in possession of controlled drugs’ (p. 
96). Although not pursued by Mayock, it is apparent that such social positioning 
will have implications for individuals’ reference points in seeking and maintaining 
respect and self-respect. In his study of youthful drug users in California (already 
discussed in Chapter 2.1), Blumer (1967) examines the patterns of drug use 
among adolescents from different social strata, observing different preferences 
and areas of overlap. For example, the ‘rowdy types’ and those involved in drug-
dealing, the ‘players’, tended to come from lower social strata, while ‘cool dudes’ 
and ‘mellow types’ were found across various strata. 
 
Finally, Mayock (2001: xvi) notes that the respondents’ drug choices do not 
remain static but are subject to revision and modification over time, partly in 
response to changes in social context. Blumer (1967) similarly finds that drug 
choices are evolving: ‘…induction into drug use is a developing experience that 
depends on the basic factors of access to drugs, acceptance by drug-using 
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associates, kinds of images youngsters have of drugs, and the runs of experience 
that affect their interpretation of drugs’ (p. 59). It may be assumed that as the 
grounds for decisions alter, so does the basis for the individual’s sense of self-
respect. Self-respect is a continually shifting and evolving phenomenon. 
 
3.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
Studies of drug users’ careers have revealed two principal ways in which self-
respect functions in the life and experience of the individual in everyday social 
life. Firstly, one’s sense of self-worth may be established by reference to socially-
determined criteria, expressed externally through the status and prestige that one 
enjoys vis-à-vis others, i.e. recognition self-respect. This status and prestige may 
be enhanced, for example through challenging another with perceived higher 
status, or acquiring material evidence indicative of one’s abilities and status. 
Recognition may be sought within the world of one’s peers, or by reference to the 
wider society.  Secondly, one may enhance one’s sense of self-worth in a more 
subjective manner, through taking action to gain control of one’s own life, 
spending time and effort in acquiring skills and expertise in some pursuit, which 
deliver personal satisfaction, or making decisions that will avoid exposing you to 
shame or allow you to join a preferred moral community, i.e. evaluative self-
respect.  
 
It is apparent that the most revealing source of information on the functioning of 
self-respect is open-ended in-depth interviewing. Data obtained by this means is 
amenable to decision-making analysis and how rational, emotional and cultural 
factors may figure, either singly or collectively, in the decisions that individuals 
make affecting their sense of self-respect. Caution is needed, however, in 
interpreting this data. In particular, the researcher needs to consider the time that 
has elapsed between the moment when a decision was made and the re-telling of 
how and why the decision was made. In the interval, the research subject’s 
circumstances may have changed, he may have undergone experiences, which 
have altered his view of his self-respect, and his perception and construction of 
past events may have also altered accordingly.  In the next chapter, in looking at 
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the application of discourse analysis methods, the range of factors that the 
researcher needs to consider are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESPECT AND SELF-RESPECT –  
GAMES PEOPLE PLAY 
 
 
4.0     Introduction 
 
In Chapter 1.3 it was proposed that showing or denying respect for others 
reinforces one’s own sense of self-respect, and conversely being shown or being 
denied respect by others has the potential to affect one’s sense of self-respect.  In 
Chapter 2 the research studies that were described illustrated how drug users who 
felt they were being denied respect took various steps to counter this denial and 
provide alternative nourishment for their sense of self-respect – through allying 
with like-minded peers who would accord them respect; through withdrawing 
from contact, as far as possible, with people who did not show them respect or 
disrespected them; or through rejecting the norms and values of those who 
‘dissed’ them. Chapter 3 reported evidence from other research studies showing 
how drug users recognise the need to take steps to enhance their own self-respect 
in order to ensure that others will respect them. The success of this strategy may 
be gauged from the reaction of researchers, particularly those in the symbolic 
interactionist tradition, who have observed their research subjects’ control, 
decisiveness and ability to organise and ‘do the business’, and have expressed 
respect for them as a result.  
 
These observed linkages beg the question, what is the nature of the connection 
between respect and self-respect? In this chapter I will explore this question by 
focusing on more microscopic elements of human social interaction – talk and 
reflexive processes – to see what light they may shed on the nature of interactions 
involving respect. 
 
4.1  Discourse Analysis 
 
Discourse analysis focuses on the mediating function of language in determining 
the structure of individuals’ thoughts and their responses in social interactions, 
establishing their ‘voice’ and shaping their ‘social intelligibility’ or their ‘social 
accountability’. The methods to be discussed in this section have all been 
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associated with the social constructionist perspective on social life, which sees 
language and discourse as constituting social life  (Burr 1995: 8–9).  Some 
approaches to social constructionism problematise the very notions of 
‘personhood’ and ‘human agency’, presenting the ‘individual’ as simply a 
grammatical construct. However, it is possible to use the analytical methods in a 
more restricted sense, without subscribing to the epistemological assumptions. For 
example, Potter and Wetherell (1987) propose approaching discourse as a topic in 
itself, independent of events, beliefs and cognitive processes, where the 
analytically prior question of how the discourse is manufactured is the focus of 
study. This kind of discourse analysis has developed predominantly within the 
field of discursive psychology, where it has been particularly useful in 
understanding ‘mind, selves and sense-making’ (Wetherell, Taylor and Yates 
2001: Part Three).  With their emphasis on ‘talk as social action’, the methods are 
appropriate for investigating the functioning of concepts such as respect and self-
respect, which mediate between individuals and their environment, and which are 
articulated through the use of discourse.  
 
Just four analytical methods, associated with some of the principal proponents of 
this approach, are discussed here – interpretive repertoires, warranting voice, 
positioning and self-narratives.  To test the relevance of interpretive repertoires, 
warranting voice and positioning in investigating the functioning of respect and 
self-respect in research subjects’ lives, a recent report on a study of heroin users 
(Downes 2003), which includes transcripts of interviews with 27 respondents and 
commentaries by some of the interviewers, is used. In an attempt to understand 
different aspects of living as heroin addicts, Paul Downes (2003) conducted a 
series of standardised open-ended interviews with Russian-speaking heroin users 
in Estonia. The interviews were conducted by university students. Although the 
use of the interviews for discourse analysis is limited owing to the interviews’ 
being translated from the original language, and owing to a lack of full 
information on the interview situations, and despite the fact that the research was 
not specifically focusing on the concept of respect in the lives of the respondents, 
the interview transcripts do provide material for exploring the potential of the 
analytical methods in investigating moral dimensions of the respondents’ lives, 
including the functioning of respect. To explore the relevance of self-narratives, 
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stories written by prisoners in Mountjoy Prison in Dublin (Hunt 1999), concerning 
their lives outside as heroin users, provide material with which to test the 
method’s potential. 
 
Interpretive Repertoire  
Potter and Wetherell (1987) propose this concept as a means of organising the 
study of what are generally termed ‘attitudes’. They suggest (1987: 54–55) that 
when a person is perceived to be expressing an attitude this may be broken down 
into the evaluative expressions that they use in discourse. Analysis of these 
expressions reveals three critical features: the context, which serves to organise 
the evaluative account; variability in the use of language to express the 
evaluation, according to the context; and the construction of the ‘attitudinal 
object’ out of this context and variation. Following from this, they argue that 
language is a performative, action-oriented function, constructed to achieve 
particular social goals rather than to represent and express inter-psychic events. 
They propose the concept of the ‘interpretive repertoire’ to account for the use of 
similar evaluative expressions by a group of individuals in depicting their actions 
and beliefs. While displaying considerable variability and inconsistency, these 
individuals draw on the same terms and constructions for characterising and 
evaluating actions, events and other phenomena. A repertoire is defined as being 
‘constituted through a limited range of terms used in particular stylistic and 
grammatical constructions. Often a repertoire will be organized around specific 
metaphors and figures of speech (tropes)’ (Potter and Wetherell 1987: 149). 
 
Downes’ (2003) interview schedule includes questions exploring the respondents’ 
views on drugs, drug prevention methods, education, the differences between men 
and women, friendship, love, self-understanding and self-awareness, trust, 
happiness, depression, the future, and the possibility of change in the world at 
large. The interview schedule does not include questions pertaining specifically to 
respect.21 However, it seems reasonable to suggest that if such questions had been 
                                                        
21 Questions might include enquiring about the individual’s perceptions of their achievements and 
disappointments, occasions when they felt proud and when they felt ashamed, when they had been 
humiliated or stigmatised by others, when they had enjoyed the recognition or respect of others, 
their experiences with institutional authority, and inviting them to identify whom they respect or 
do not respect. 
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asked, it would be possible to compile interpretive repertoires based on 
respondents’ answers, indicating the nature and level of their self-respect and how 
respect influences their relations with others.  
 
Warranting Voice  
This analytical method may be viewed as an individualistic version of Potter and 
Wetherell’s  ‘interpretive repertoire’ (Burr 1995: 120–121). Gergen (1989), 
propounder of the approach, suggests that while the existence of the ‘self’ cannot 
be established by inductive means, such as referring to qualities of mental states, 
it may be observed through studying linguistic discourses as part of a social 
process. He argues that the mental world becomes elaborated as various interest 
groups within a culture seek to warrant or justify their accounts of the world. By 
establishing a ‘hegemony in world construction’, people may find self-fulfilment, 
love, freedom, position or respect.  
 
Gergen defines ‘conventions of warrant’ as a means whereby people ‘furnish 
rationales as to why a certain voice (typically their own) is to be granted 
superiority by offering rationales or justifications’ (Gergen 1989: 74). They 
establish their warrant by referring to mental events such as ‘I know’, ‘I saw it 
with my own eyes’; by challenging others’ warranting activity by means such as 
‘You only think that, you don’t know’, ‘Don’t get hysterical’, or ‘My position is 
based on reason; I am logical while you are irrational’; by offering refinements 
such as distinguishing between true observation and biased observation, pointing 
to circular arguments, or lack of moral fibre; or by referring to higher mental 
capacity through education, extensive reading or experience of the world.  It is by 
mastering such techniques of discourse that the individual obtains a warrant: 
… it is not the person who professes a flagging self-esteem, a low level of morale 
or a guilty conscience who has an ‘inadequate’ conception of self: each of these 
forms of self-accounting can be vitally effective, and often enable one to achieve 
a certain form of power in social life. Rather, it is the inarticulate or linguistically 
undifferentiated individual who requires attention. Such an individual is simply 
bereft of the symbolic resources necessary for full social functioning. (Gergen 
1989: 76) 
 
In his interview responses, ethnic Estonian Erkki, a 22-year-old active heroin user 
who is not in treatment (Downes 2003: 71–76), establishes a strong warranting 
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voice for himself. It is possible to read this warranting voice as an assertion of his 
own sense of self-worth, partly achieved through expressing a lack of concern or 
respect for the rest of society. Throughout the interview Erkki continually 
questions the sense or appropriateness of the questions being put by the 
interviewer – for example, ‘You can put it that way’; ‘And I should tell them 
[Erkki’s dreams] to you? … Let’s move on’; ‘If you want to call that happiness 
then go ahead’; ‘You once asked that already’; ‘sentimental question. Why the 
hell do you ask that?’; ‘Why do you think I want children?’.  Erkki also distances 
himself from society. In answer to the very first question, ‘Has any drug campaign 
had any effect on you?’, he responds, ‘Not so far (smiling). Don’t really see the 
danger of using drugs’, and in answer to a follow-up question, regarding the link 
between the perceived dangers of drugs and generally accepted norms in society, 
he replies, ‘In what society? The shit hole we live in? Nothing accepted here. Not 
in general anyway.’ He also expresses contempt for specific groups in society, for 
example Russians, gays, the elderly, women. Asked what he would like to change 
in the world, he replies, ‘ As long as I’m fine or ok I don’t care about others. If 
some nigger dies in Africa – who cares. I’m no saviour nor a God. Let the world 
stay as it is and strongest will survive.’ 
 
Positioning  
This method focuses on the dynamic, immediate and transitory self as constructed 
in relation to others in conversation (Davies and Harré 1990). ‘Positioning’ is 
contrasted with ‘role’, which Davies and Harré see as static, formal and ritualistic, 
and a consequence of our attempts to create a consistent and unitary account of 
ourselves over time, but which denies the variability, shifting and contradictory 
positions so evident in our day-to-day conduct.  
 
Positioning occurs in the course of conversations, episodes of human interaction. 
The key analytical components include identifying categories of people, selecting 
story lines from a wide variety of possible forms, positioning ourselves in terms of 
the chosen categories and story lines, and recognising ourselves in these positions.  
These components are manifested in our choice of words, images and metaphors, 
our way of talking on the occasion, and our political and moral commitments in 
the course of talking. This analysis reveals the autobiographical elements in our 
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talk, through which it is possible to find out how each actor in a conversation 
conceives of themselves and of the other participants. Notable features of 
positioning are that it is interactive, in that what one persons says influences the 
positioning of the other person; it is reflexive in that each actor continuously 
considers his position; and it is not necessarily intentional in that the interaction 
with another person and continuous reflexivity mean that one’s self is ongoingly 
produced. 
 
Downes’ report (2003: 46– 49) reproduces an interview with Maxim, a Russian-
speaking 21-year-old attending a methadone maintenance centre, together with 
extensive comments by the interviewer, a female Latvian university student, on 
her reaction in the interview. Maxim’s responses to the interview questions reveal 
an empty and very negative view of his life and of the world, and a low sense of 
self-esteem: he expresses his sense of loneliness, unhappiness; powerlessness, 
hopelessness, uselessness and the loss of his potential. In response to a question 
about whether there are many things that irritate him, he also indicates a lack of 
self-respect: ‘Yes. Sometimes everything. I just go along the street and everything 
irritates me. Cars, people. Seems like they are looking at you like from above. 
Probably they are not, but that’s how I see them.’  
 
While it is not possible to access Maxim’s positioning and repositioning in the 
course of the interaction, it is possible to see how the interviewer positioned 
herself at the start of the interview and repositioned herself in the course of the 
interview, in response to Maxim’s behaviours and statements and in reaction to 
her own perceptions and appraisal of Maxim’s positioning. As she positions and 
repositions herself, it is evident how she begins to develop respect for Maxim. She 
describes how Maxim did not take his jacket and hat off and seemed nervous and 
tense at the beginning. She started by talking about herself, where she was from, 
what her name was and why she was there: ‘Maxim was rather responsive and 
that helped us a lot and in a way tore down the possible barrier and distance 
between us’. She goes on to describe how she was ‘surprised’ by Maxim’s 
responses, and how she began to realise he was not one of society’s outcasts, an 
angry, negative, suspicious person, but a sensitive person, ‘in many ways just like 
me and all the other young people around’. He used to study, have plans, ideas, 
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interests and even a girlfriend before he began using heroin. She describes the 
interview and it is possible to see how, while repositioning Maxim as she listened 
to his answers, she also repositioned herself, according him the respect that she 
already accorded herself as a ‘normal person’: 
He was being very frank and open and didn’t view us as a potential threat or 
someone who has come to look at him from above. I was afraid of that, so during 
the interview I was trying to sound as natural as possible and be as sincere as I 
can, so that he would see me as a young person just like him. Just a short 
sentence was needed to break the ice or a possible wall that was built by my 
suspicion and prejudice towards him. When asked what is the most important and 
valuable thing in his life, he answered: ‘Mother’. That’s when I identified with 
him and felt like saying, ‘I know what you mean. I know just how it feels.’ This 
was one thing that made me realise he was a normal person, it’s just that at some 
point something went terribly wrong and now this young man is lost. (Downes 
2003: 49) 
 
Self-Narrative  
Self-narratives comprise a series of elements (including an endpoint, a sequence 
of events in a particular order, a causal explanation, and beginnings and endings) 
which are derived from a range of possible forms available within the narrator’s 
culture (Gergen 1994). Furthermore, far from being scripted through looking 
inwards to our own individual cognitive processes and interpretations of the 
world, the narrative is dependent on, and sustained by, interchange and dialogue 
with others – both those who have participated in the events that we relate in our 
narratives and those who listen to our stories and appraise them. With an endpoint 
that is generally invested with value, the narrative gives a sense of coherence, 
direction and meaning to a person’s life. Gergen divides self-narratives into three 
varieties – a ‘stability narrative’, in which an individual’s life simply proceeds 
unchanged, neither better not worse, in relation to the endpoint; a  ‘progressive 
narrative’, in which the individual moves up towards an improved evaluative 
endpoint; and a ‘regressive narrative’, in which the narrator moves away from the 
evaluative endpoint. While not arguing that our life stories are culturally 
determined or that our identities are shaped by external forces, Gergen (1994: 
255) suggests that ‘self-narratives do invite certain actions and discourage others’. 
 
The social functions ascribed to self-narrative indicate why it may prove a fruitful 
means of investigating the interplay of respect and self-respect in a person’s life. 
Self-narratives are characterised as ‘cultural resources that serve such social 
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purposes as self-identification, self-justification, self-criticism, and self-
solidification’ (Gergen 1994: 249). They render a person ‘socially intelligible’, 
both in helping to explain to themselves where their lives may be leading them to 
in the future, be it to an improved or a disimproved life, and in explaining to 
others why they are as they are. As a consequence, a person’s sense of their place 
in life, their purpose in life, their self-worth, can change over time as they retell 
their story and morally re-evaluate their lives. The incidents in a self-narrative 
also generally involve other people and it is important to the continued validity of 
the self-narrative that these people continue to play out certain past roles in 
relation to the narrator, and that the narrator also continues to play out the 
appropriate past roles in these other people’s self-narratives. 
What this means is that self-narrative is not simply a derivative of past 
encounters, reassembled within ongoing relationships; once used, it establishes 
the grounds for moral being within the community. It establishes reputation, and 
it is the community of reputations that forms the core of moral tradition. In effect, 
the performance of a self-narrative secures a relational future. …[Furthermore] 
Identities, in this sense, are never individual; each is suspended in an array of 
precariously situated relations. (Gergen 1994: 257–259) 
 
In a short story (Hunt 1999: 99–109), written ostensibly about scoring his next fix, 
the author, Boo-Boo, a heroin addict serving a prison sentence, provides a fine 
example of a self-narrative that renders the narrator ‘socially intelligible’. 
Dedicated to the author’s son, ‘for him to read when he is older’, the narrative 
relates the conflicting feelings that Boo-Boo experiences the night he hears he is 
to be father. There are three very different feelings expressed – one revealing a 
lack of self-esteem, one revealing unadulterated elation, and one generated by 
inhaling a chemical substance. Firstly, while waiting for his girlfriend to complete 
the pregnancy test, he recounts: ‘All of a sudden BANG! It hits me and I think, 
“Fuck me, I could be a dad soon!” I have a hundred different thoughts running 
around in my head…If she comes out and tells me she isn’t pregnant, I know I’d 
be disappointed. But at the same time, I wonder if I’m ready to be a dad. At the 
moment I’m nothing but a junkie and have been for the last few years. How can I 
be a decent father if I can’t stop taking heroin?’ Secondly, when he hears he is to 
be a father,  ‘A great shout of happiness escapes through my lips. I feel over the 
moon, on top of the world, and nothing on this earth can ever take that moment 
away from me.’ And finally, he describes the feelings he experiences after 
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injecting heroin – ‘As I send the smack home, I get the same old feeling, a little 
rush through the body’ – and smoking cannabis – ‘It’s very hard to describe this 
feeling. People have asked me to describe it many times, but I just can’t find any 
words. It’s like acting in a film, reading the book of it and watching it all at once. 
That might sound strange and weird but it’s the best I can do.’  
 
The narration of these feelings is embedded in a story that unfolds in a sequence 
of interactions with a series of different actors in different locations – with his 
girlfriend, father and mother in a pub, where the news of his impending 
fatherhood is announced; in a shopping centre, where ‘everyone seems to be 
running around like headless chickens’, and where he has an encounter with a car 
while crossing the street and throws a chip at the driver  – ‘Fuck off ye baldy 
prick’; in the flat of Mr Tambourine Man (his supplier), where he injects himself 
with heroin and shoots the breeze with his friends; in the street again, where he is 
stopped by the Gardaí, who ask him to empty his pockets – ‘I tell him [a Garda] to 
empty them as I put me hands on the car and spread me legs. They hate when you 
do that’ – and they send him on his way, calling him a ‘little scumbag’; and 
finally at home, where he rolls himself a joint and receives a lecture on giving up 
drugs from his girlfriend, before going up to bed alone to smoke his joint.  
 
Written for his new-born son while he is in prison, Boo-Boo’s story may be read 
partly as a ‘progressive narrative’ and partly as a ‘stability narrative’. Boo-Boo 
expresses his pride in becoming a father, something that nothing, not even his 
own failings, will ever be able to destroy. At the same time he places this feeling 
of pride within the context of other aspects of his life, which may be expected to 
reduce his ability to demonstrate his pride in, and love for, his son – his drug-
using, which gives him unique and pleasurable feelings, and his relations with 
others, such as members of the public, law enforcement agents, and his family and 
girlfriend, which problematise his sense of self-respect. For example, his 
girlfriend gets at him: ‘… you can’t keep this up now [drug use and crime]. 
You’ve got responsibility now.’  
 
Boo-Boo’s narrative may be read as expressing his sense of his own self-worth as 
a father but also as accounting for his lack of recognition self-respect – he is, after 
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all, in prison – and his lack of recognition-respect for members of the public and 
representatives of authority and the establishment, especially when they appear 
critical or contemptuous of him, as evidenced by his contemptuous and unco-
operative behaviour towards them. The story is Boo-Boo’s attempt to render 
himself ‘socially intelligible’ to his son and worthy of his respect. The final 
paragraph describes how Boo-Boo wakes up to discover his joint has burnt a large 
hole in his jumper: ‘It’s smouldering and the smell of it is horrible. I jump up and 
tear it off me and scrunch it up and put it out.’ This may be read metaphorically as 
conveying Boo-Boo’s disgust with his drug habit and his desire to cease using. It 
is interesting to speculate about the story Boo-Boo will write after he has left 
prison and returns to the environment in which the events in the story were 
located, to discover how he accounts for the functioning of respect and self-
respect in his subsequent life experiences. 
 
4.2 Reflexive Thought 
 
An interest in the language and discourse surrounding the functioning of respect 
and self-respect in the lives of drug users begs the question, how do researchers 
themselves understand the concepts in their lives and in their research, and how 
does this affect the research process and their findings? In Chapter 1.2 I discussed 
the symbolic interactionist view that the researcher’s work is profoundly affected 
by the researcher’s attitude and respect or lack of respect for his research subjects. 
In this section I consider three participant observation studies of groups of people 
involved in the world of drugs, exploring whether and how the researchers 
worked reflexively. I use the concept ‘reflexive’ to refer to the manner in which 
researchers conduct their research not only with reference to independent 
definitions and normative understandings of the concepts but also through 
reflection on the functioning of the concepts in their own lives and in the research 
process. 
 
Interested in researching ‘deviance’, Lawrence Wieder (1974) secured a job with 
the Department of Corrections in Los Angeles. His task was to investigate why a 
half-way house in the city, designed to support narcotics felons leaving prison, did 
not improve parole addicts’ chances of abstaining from drug use. Entitled 
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Language and Social Reality, Wieder’s study compares traditional ethnographic 
and ethnomethodological approaches to the analysis of language in the research 
situation, and considers how the research approach influences the research 
findings and conclusions. He uses the discourse around respect by his research 
subjects as an example for illuminating his theoretical argument.  
 
What is interesting for the purposes of this dissertation is the way in which 
Wieder’s account of the functioning of respect between persons in the half-way 
house varies according to the methodological approach that is being used. In the 
‘traditional ethnographic’ explanation, which posits a ‘legitimate, normative 
order’ and observes behaviours which deviate from the normative order, i.e. 
deviant behaviours, and which regards  ‘talk only as a source of data for analysis’, 
we are shown how the residents give grudging directive-respect to the staff and 
their house rules, but reserve appraisal respect for their fellow residents, which is 
given within the context of their own ‘convict code’.  
 
Turning next to a ‘folk-sociology’ account,22 in which residents and staff describe 
and analyse the commitments, beliefs and actions of residents by formulating their 
accounts in terms of the ‘code’, Wieder finds that the research subjects formulate 
a ‘social reality’, containing moral alternatives, role relationships, caste conflicts, 
and rational action. Respect plays an important, and richer, part in these 
formulations of the situation. Residents explain how their behaviours are 
constrained by the ‘code’, by the normative requirements of their group, and staff, 
in turn, describe how they recognise and respect the residents’ obligations to their 
‘code’.  
 
Wieder goes on to suggest that this ‘folk sociology’ account is akin to an oral 
history, ‘an exegetical organised narrative’, intended to help participants analyse 
their experiences and to instruct outsiders, through acting as ‘embedded 
instruction’ for seeing the formal structures of resident conduct. However, the 
narrative is still separate from the occurrences it describes; it serves as a 
                                                        
22 Folk sociology, in which the research subjects produce the account, is characterised as sharing ‘ 
many formal and substantive properties with the explanations of professional sociologists’ (Wieder 
1974: 44). 
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commentary on what occurs; the hearer listens passively to the narrative, rather 
than actively encountering and engaging with the narrative. It is to this ‘telling of 
the code’, in which the code is ‘told’ in the course of continuous, connected and 
consequential action, involving both the researcher and the researched, that 
Wieder next turns. 
 
From the point of view of the teller, usually a resident of the half-way house, 
telling the code is ‘a method of persuasion and justification’ (p. 175; italics in 
original), and a means by which the teller of the code can command the respect of 
others:  
This means that inasmuch as the way that alter’s activity appears to ego as 
coherently organized and meaningful is dependent on the ways alter talks about 
what he is doing, ego’s sense for what alter is doing is contingent upon whatever 
‘goals’, ‘projects’, or ‘interests’ alter attempts to realize in or through his 
interaction with ego. … Guided perception through description has the character 
of being subject to ‘interests’ in this way, because the same explanatory and 
descriptive utterances often are, and always can be, sanctions, justifications, or 
urgings of some course of action in the relationship between hearer and speaker. 
(p. 175)  
 
The staff of the half-way house are also concerned to be respected by residents as 
well as other staff. Wieder describes how residents could use the telling of the 
code to indicate to staff how the resident assessed their competence, i.e. their 
knowledgeability about the code, and to show respect or disrespect for a member 
of staff would use the ‘telling of the code’. Staff with demonstrably poor 
understanding of the workings of the code were described as ‘stupid, square, 
fools, and naïve, and, therefore, they could not be respected’. They were given 
derogatory nicknames and stories were circulated underlining their stupidity. 
 
Turning to the listener (the researcher), Wieder shifts his attention from describing 
the objects experienced by the ethnographer to describing the course of 
experiencing the occurrences qua objects. Defining it as the ‘documentary method 
of interpretation’, he describes how the ethnographer gradually elaborates his 
schema through assembling pieces, as in a jigsaw, to produce reality. The 
ethnomethodological turn is to suggest that the shape of the social reality that is 
described is dependent on being instructed by the actors themselves as to the 
actual patterns of behaviours and motivations: ‘The “instruction” is accomplished 
from within a setting for an observer who attends to the ways that members 
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[research subjects] talk about their affairs’ (p. 189). Without the research subjects’ 
talk, Wieder suggests that the observer’s understanding of what is occurring may 
be quite different. For example, without knowledge of the residents’ code, strictly 
applying rational choice theory to the residents’ observed behaviour in the half-
way house, and assuming that the residents are orienting their behaviour to 
maximise their opportunities to achieve a certain type of therapy, Wieder suggests 
that it would be possible to interpret the behaviours categorised as ‘doing 
disinterest’ and ‘doing disrespect’ as negatively sanctioning forms of therapy that 
the residents do not think beneficial, rather than showing disinterest or disrespect 
(pp. 194–195). Alternatively, without the residents’ talk, the group of behaviours 
could be seen as complying with a stylistic maxim ‘Stay cool’:  
Compliance with the maxim, ‘be cool’, requires that one show his dominance 
over his circumstances by suppressing any show of affect and interest in 
occurrences in his situation. Persons complying with such a rule do so out of 
motivations to obtain the respect and admiration of their fellows, in contrast to 
motivations to obtain the trust of their fellows, which is the motivation to comply 
with the maxim, ‘Show your loyalty to the residents’ (p. 198; italics in original). 
 
Without delving further into the debate on the different research approaches, these 
different takes on social life, and the functioning of respect and self-respect, in the 
half-way house underline the need for an inquirer into the functioning of respect 
in everyday social life to have regard to the context in which she is observing 
interactions, and the role of the researcher and the researched in producing and 
recording data. Is it evidence of respect or self-respect, and, if so, what kinds? Or 
is it evidence, in reality, of some other social phenomenon at work, such as a 
desire for identity or for power? Two other ethnographic studies set within the 
drug world highlight how the researcher’s interactions with her research subjects 
and her collection and analysis of data can influence the resulting account of the 
functioning of respect and self-respect in the lives of the research subjects. 
 
Between 1974 and 1980 Patricia Adler and her husband, Peter Adler, lived and 
socialised in an upper-level drug dealing and smuggling community located in the 
south-western United States. Based on participant observation over the six-year 
period and depth interviews with individual participants, the resulting 
ethnographic study of the community is entitled Wheeling and Dealing (1985). 
Adler’s approaches the study from the perspective of existential sociology, which 
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‘analyzes behaviour as being motivated by underlying “brute feelings”, drives and 
emotions, … [which] are independent of and dominant over norms, values, and 
cognition, although these commonly run into and pervade each other’ (p. 2). She 
argues that the driving force behind people’s entry into and remaining in the 
community is hedonism.  
 
Notwithstanding a question mark over the validity of Adler’s determinist 
approach to sociological analysis, her account of the economic and social 
substructure of the drug dealers’ world indicates the importance of recognition 
(institutional-)respect in the extra-legal world of drug smuggling and dealing in 
the ‘prestige hierarchy’. Adler describes the phenomenon of ‘prestige mobility’, 
whereby recognition (institutional-)respect could be won and, almost inevitably, 
lost, as the drug trafficker’s early rationalism, goal-orientation, and self-control 
gave way to the heavy partying, impulsive behaviour, and present-orientation so 
prevalent within the subculture of hedonism. While recognition-respect is viewed 
as important in sustaining the substructure, Adler’s account suggests the research 
subjects had no need for evaluative respect or self-respect. Self-esteem, or even 
self-indulgence, appears to be all. 
When they separated from the mainstream culture and ideology, they abandoned 
their predominantly instrumental, goal-seeking, controlled, and future-oriented 
behaviour. They ceased to think of their selves as something to be ‘attained, 
created, achieved,’ and focused instead on discovering and satisfying their deep, 
unsocialized inner impulses. They therefore sought self-expression in those acts 
which resulted from lowering inhibitions, freeing themselves from rational 
planning, and indulging in ‘mad desires and errant fancies.’ Satisfying their 
immediate pleasures thus came to take precedence over planned behaviour. (p. 
154) 
 
In Wieder’s terms, Adler’s account may be classed as a ‘traditional ethnography’, 
based on the formulation of a normative paradigm and observations charting 
participants’ conformity or deviations from the paradigm. Interestingly, respect 
and self-respect are presented as important features neither of the normative 
paradigm nor in the lives of the research subjects. Furthermore, Adler herself 
expresses what amounts to a lack of respect for her research subjects. She 
discusses the ‘cultural clash’ between herself and her husband on the one hand, 
and their research subjects on the other: ‘… as researchers try to get depth 
involvement, they are apt to come across fundamental differences in character, 
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values, and attitudes between their subjects and themselves. In our case, we were 
most strongly confronted by differences in present versus future orientations, a 
desire for risk versus security, and feelings of spontaneity versus self-discipline’ 
(p. 24). She remarks, moreover, that she and her husband often felt ‘frustrated’ by 
their research subjects’ behaviours and actions, which they saw as ‘irrational’ or 
‘foolhardy’. It may be asked, if Adler had interacted more reflexively with her 
research subjects, would she have generated a more nuanced and ambiguous 
account of, inter alia, the functioning of respect and self-respect in the lives of her 
research subjects. 
 
For five years, between 1982 and 1986, Terry Williams spent two hours a day, 
three days a week, ‘hanging out’ with a ‘crew’ of eight teenage cocaine dealers, 
mainly of Dominican descent, in the Washington Heights area of New York City. 
He wanted to find out about kids who sell drugs – how do they get into the 
business, how do they stay in it, how transient is their involvement, can they get 
out, where do they go if they do get out, and what are the rewards for those who 
succeed? In The Cocaine Kids (1990) he gives a graphic account of the cocaine 
trade in New York City. The participants occupy various levels in an 
‘institutional’ hierarchy, comprising wholesalers, suppliers, dealers and a host of 
lower functionaries; they maintain and improve their position in the hierarchy 
through evidence of their ability, discipline and reliability, and their capacity to 
manage the complex business of obtaining and selling drugs and to interact 
effectively with a wide range of people. Sine qua nons are staying out of prison; 
avoiding the use of crack, although snorting cocaine is acceptable; and 
maintaining loyalty to family and friends. The possession and visible spending of 
money are critical to maintaining position and status. Williams acknowledges the 
deprivation and marginalisation that the kids experienced in their growing up as a 
factor leading them into drug dealing (p. ix) and sees the world they inhabit as 
being separate from the rest of society through its being beyond the law (pp. ix, 1-
2, 8, 132).  
 
The ‘heart’ of the book, however, is the stories of the young cocaine dealers – 
their lives, their struggles with family problems, how they managed money, 
girlfriends and boyfriends, how they ran a business, and made decisions about 
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their futures. In a form akin to a novel, Williams portrays a series of characters 
who bring their own personalities, skills and expertise, goals and aspirations to 
bear on their interactions with others: ‘In many ways, these kids and others like 
them simply want respect: they are willing to risk their lives to attain those prized 
adult rewards of power, prestige and wealth’ (p. x).  
 
Although respect may be a ‘simple’ want, obtaining it is a complex, dynamic 
process for the cocaine kids. Williams describes an interactive process of giving 
and receiving respect among themselves and in their business, social and family 
worlds. Self-respect is tied up with a raft of emotions and feelings including trust, 
loyalty, love, hope, ambition, fear and doubt. Relations with outsiders are 
characterised by avoidance and mistrust: the kids do not appear to expect or seek 
respect outside.  
 
The ‘crew’ is held together by its organisational purpose of obtaining cocaine 
from suppliers and selling it to customers.  Selecting people to work in the crew 
involves looking for people with skills to manage the substance and also the 
interpersonal encounters – in short, people who enjoy institutional (recognition-
)respect. For example, Max, who runs the crew, has become established after 
wining the trust of a ‘connect’ (a high-level drugs supplier) through demonstrating 
his ability and reliability: ‘Nobody trusted me with any material at first. … I had 
to convince people I could do it. I didn’t have my hand out for no charity. I 
worked hard to get established’ (p. 32). In turn, Max recruits and tests his second-
in-command, Chillie, who is adept at running the business and holding the crew 
together on the ground. However, Max will not introduce Chillie to his supplier: ‘I 
[Chillie] made over a million dollars selling this stuff. If the connect knew what I 
was doing, he would want to see me. Max knows I do the best business out here. I 
don’t want except a little money and a little respect’ (p. 19). Jake, working as a 
street dealer for Max, seeks recognition-respect via a different route: ‘When I got 
the nine millimeter [gun], I told everyone. I wanted them to know I was no pussy 
and not to fuck with me. I wasn’t going to hurt nobody, but I didn’t want to be 
soft – like they thought I was because I did what Max told me’ (p. 60). The gun 
provided Jake with obstacle recognition-respect, and also recognition self-respect 
based on his enhanced sense of autonomy. 
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Recognition self-respect is an important element in the minds of several of the 
other kids as well, who sought it, however, outside the cocaine world. ‘It is clear 
that the Kids who left the [cocaine] business were those who had a stake in 
something. … All the Kids except Jake have also begun to live outside the 
underground: for them, I believe, the cocaine trade was only a stepping stone to 
the realities of surviving in the larger world’ (Williams 1990: 131). It does not 
work out for all of them. For example, Chillie informs Williams, ‘I go to school 
now for college credit at the City University. …I really wanna finish. I don’t want 
to get trapped in this coke business. But as long as I don’t do that and have my 
goal, I’ll be alright’ (p. 75). However, Chillie’s sense of self-worth is vulnerable. 
After a visit to his house by the police, Chillie switches to selling on the street 
instead of from his house: ‘Not only did he [Chillie] not like this, he felt it was 
beneath him, a man who once had workers dealing for him, a payroll, a reputation, 
respect and pride’ (p. 118). He begins sniffing more cocaine, cutting classes, and 
finally not attending school at all. Another crewmember, Masterrap, is also aware 
of the bigger picture: ‘When Chillie asked me to be part of his crew, I told him I 
would do it only for two years. I said I would do it if we could make some crazy 
dollars. I wanted the money to make a demo [demonstration record] and go into 
the record business. I’ve made some money now and I got my demo. After this 
year, I stop. It’s been more than two years, I know, but I’m moving in a way I feel 
good about’ (p. 88). Masterrap does not make it into the record business: he has 
begun living with his girlfriend, is expecting a child and needs to make steady 
money, so he has taken on a job as assistant to a chef (p. 125).  
 
Not only may a person’s self-respect be vulnerable, it may also be ill-founded, 
which in turn leads to others’ withdrawing their respect, which leads to a 
spiralling downwards of self-respect. Max’s older brother, Hector, who works as a 
member of Max’s crew, was once a major dealer. He got into trouble with the 
police and was imprisoned for a year, after which he wasn’t ‘good’ any more, as 
Max explained: ‘He was still making money for his connect, but he owed him 
twenty thousand dollars. The cops took the car. He wasn’t getting no respect from 
his people because he wasn’t reliable enough and plus everybody knew he was on 
the pipe [smoking base cocaine, i.e. with the hydrochloride removed]. It was 
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killing him’ (pp. 44–45). Hector himself attributed his decline to a denial of 
recognition-respect by others: ‘You know, certain people put you in a position, 
but they don’t have no business being there. I mean like the cops – they don’t 
know how to go about dealing with people. When I got busted for taking some 
coke in my car, I admit I was incorrect in that move. But the cops never told me 
about my rights. After that happened, I just wanted to strike back in some way. 
All my life I have seen people like that, who hold you in a position to tell you 
what to do, or keep you down. And they want you to give up trying’ (p. 43). On 
another occasion, he refers to his own lack of recognition self-respect: he 
attributes his craving for cocaine to having no money, his inability to find a job 
and his lack of will power (pp. 121–122). Max, on the other hand, attributes 
Hector’s decline to an over-vaunted evaluation self-respect, blaming Hector’s own 
ignorance and obstinacy, and his belief in his invincibility (pp. 43–44).  
 
Occasional crewmember Splib highlights the complex interrelationship between 
self-image, self-respect and respect, and again how self-deception can distort 
perceptions of these. Williams introduces Splib thus: ‘He is wise, handsome, and 
above all else a survivor. He also takes great pleasure in his ability to con and 
manipulate people [including his friends and colleagues]’ (p. 21).  Williams 
describes how he has a strong ego and an over-riding belief in his own abilities 
and rarely admits to being wrong: if something does not work out; it is due to 
events beyond his control. This belief generally carries the day: ‘Although Splib is 
known for his daily lament of disasters, he is still respected for his keen wit, 
intelligence and an uncanny ability to emerge unscathed from the most difficult 
situations’ (p. 67).   
 
The frailty of the link between Splib’s self-image and reality comes to the fore in 
his relationship with his wife Kitty, the eighth member of the crew.  Splib’s ego 
drives him to want to dominate all the women he meets, including Kitty. He 
claims that he taught her everything she knows about cocaine and dealing, blames 
her for failings in the marriage, and intimates that he is the strength behind the 
relationship. Finally, however, Kitty has had enough and leaves him, thereby 
asserting her own self-respect: ‘Splib told me he wanted to get back together, but I 
think it’s not possible. I tried to overlook the past and I cannot do it – I mean, fuck 
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the past, look at the present. He’s humiliated me too much. … I told him that I 
didn’t want to share him with anybody – I mean especially physically, but he has 
refused to accept me, my feelings. You know, Splib has never treated me like he 
wanted me – he always wanted something from me. If he had his way, he 
wouldn’t work at all, he would just have me do everything, including make all the 
money’ (pp. 127–128).  In explanation of these self-deceptions, Williams 
suggested these kids’ ‘only shield against fear and uncertainty was a sense of their 
own immortality’ (p. 2). 
 
While the kids aspire to move out of the cocaine world into the straight world, 
using the money that they will have earned through their coke dealing, they reveal 
difficulties in dealing with the outside world and a consequent diminution of their 
sense of self-worth. Hector’s resentment of the treatment he received at the hands 
of the police, which amounted to humiliation, has been mentioned above. 
Williams believes that Hector’s brother, Max, who could barely read or write 
English, was ‘reluctant to discuss school when Chillie was around, perhaps 
because Max is genuinely embarrassed about his lack of schooling and doesn’t 
want Chillie to have the upper hand in anything’ (p. 74). In discussing his failure 
to learn, Max does not blame the school or the education system, but rather sees it 
simply as not something for which he was suited: ‘I never cared much about 
school because I was facing the street every day. There was a time I’d think about 
school – but not that much, because everybody don’t fit in school. I didn’t. … I 
never liked the school, I never liked the teachers, and I never liked the kids’ (pp. 
74–75).  
 
Notable in the responses Williams elicited from his research subjects is their 
willingness to talk to him. Williams’ remarks about his first meeting with crew-
leader Max, ‘I assumed we would talk and go our separate ways: he trusted my 
friend [who made the introduction] but he was shy; there was certainly no reason 
for him to talk with me about anything, and I was not about to press the issue. But 
there was something special about Max, and he became my friend and guide for 
nearly five years. I think we got along because I was an outsider and he had a 
story to tell, and he chose me to tell it to’ (p. 13). All the kids spoke openly with 
Williams, justifying it by saying he should ‘get the truth’ for his book: he was 
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perceived as ‘the sympathetic listener, the person who could hear all and 
everything and still be trusted’ (pp. 82–83). This is the closest any of the research 
studies examined come to revealing the actual need of the research subjects to be 
valued and respected by another person. 
 
Williams describes his approach to his research as follows: ‘For more than four 
years, I asked questions and recorded the answers without trying to find support 
for any particular thesis. In the process, I found that the truth was embedded in a 
complex, miniature society with institutions, laws, morality, language, codes of 
behaviour all its own’ (pp.1–2). While not an ethnomethodological approach, 
Williams’ ethnographic account accesses the inherent ambiguities and 
contradictions, in other words the evolving nature of the kids’ own perceived 
respect-standing, through describing the interactions between themselves, 
between them and outsiders such as law enforcement agents or educational 
institutions, and also their responses to structural demands such as the need to 
make money in order to support a child.  
 
4.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter the application of a selection of methods of discourse analysis has 
revealed that the relationship between respect and self-respect in social 
interactions is not a simple linear process but is part of a complex web of dynamic 
interactive factors. These factors include the purpose of the interaction as it is 
understood by each participant, and their evolving perception of its purpose a the 
interview progresses, the evolving interests and motives of each participant in the 
interaction, the physical circumstances supporting the interaction, such as 
location, and the wider socio-cultural context within which the interaction occurs 
including other people associated in some way with the interaction, with their own 
interests and motives.  
 
Not only is the relationship between respect and self-respect interdependent in a 
complex, non-linear manner but it is also intersubjective. The study by Wieder 
(1974) highlights the way in which the reflexive thought of both the researcher 
and his research subjects influence the way in which respect is observed to 
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function, and functions. Williams’ (1991) account of the lives and experiences of 
the ‘cocaine kids’ is a revealing and insightful account of the functioning of 
respect and self-respect, owing to the manner in which the researcher describes 
the functioning of respect and self-respect not just from the perspective of his 
own interactions with the research subjects, but also among the research subjects 
themselves, and between the research subjects and outside agencies. It is 
important that the researcher demonstrate a capacity for reflexive thought, i.e. a 
capacity to reflect on her own role in the research process and the intersubjective 
nature of the creation of research data by both the research subject and the 
researcher.  
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Conclusions 
 
 
Given that this dissertation’s intention was to provide a ‘survey’ of possible 
approaches to the investigation of respect and self-respect, the conclusions that 
follow are offered as a preliminary, provisional template for further inquiry.  
 
Social research studies that consider the functioning of respect indicate that the 
concept may be viewed as functioning in everyday social life as an organising 
principle, whereby a person orders her social world. It provides a means whereby 
she can categorise other people according to some objective value, such as 
dignity or character, and rationally order her social preferences. It is also a means 
whereby she may assess the sources from which she receives respect, and the 
amount and value of the respect she enjoys, and decide how to act, according to 
whether she is satisfied with the respect she is accorded or wishes to increase it.  
 
The studies considered have indicated that the concept of self-respect has two 
principal functions in everyday social life. On the one hand it serves as a means 
whereby a person may adjust her actions, behaviour, appearance and so on, to 
match her actual status or a status to which she aspires in society (recognition 
self-respect). On the other hand, it serves as a means whereby a person may 
decide on a course of action consistent with her personal standards or character 
(appraisal self-respect). As a social mechanism, self-respect articulates between 
the individual as she perceives herself in the social world and as she perceives 
herself in the moral world. Its functioning is linked to the ‘social emotions’ of 
pride and shame. 
 
Respect and self-respect in everyday social life function in a manner akin to a 
private social accounting process, in which the person continually calculates the 
value of various relationships and associations to her own respect-standing, and 
makes adjustments in her own dispositions and behaviours accordingly, both to 
indicate respect or lack of respect for others and to protect or enhance her own 
self-respect. Tending towards the establishment of a social equilibrium for each 
person, each individual’s social accounting process contributes to a continuing 
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dialectical, intersubjective process, as that person’s calculations with regard to 
respect and self-respect are interdependent with other people’s calculations in 
regard to their respect-standing and respecting behaviours.  
 
Considering theoretical approaches to investigating respect and self-respect, I 
have ranged across a wide selection of possible sociological approaches, including 
functionalism, structural analysis, critical discourse analysis, face-to-face 
interaction, symbolic interactionism, social constructionism, discourse analysis 
and ethnomethodology. These approaches, which have each provided useful 
insights or interpretive/analytical techniques, have haled from both sides of the 
structure/agency debate. This eclecticism is probably appropriate. Respect and 
self-respect do not observe the distinction between agent and structure. 
Goffman’s23 depiction of the interaction order as embracing both the patterns 
contained in social structures on the one hand and the diversity of individual 
intentions on the other, provides a model that accommodates the functioning of 
respect and self-respect as outlined in this dissertation: 
… what one finds, in modern societies at least, is a nonexclusive linkage – a 
‘loose coupling’ – between interactional practices and social structures, a 
collapsing of strata and structures into broader categories, the categories 
themselves not corresponding one-to-one to anything in the structured world, a 
gearing as it were of various structures into interactional cogs. Or, if you will, a 
set of transformation rules, or a membrane selecting how various externally 
relevant social distinctions will be managed within the interaction. (Goffman 
1983: 11) 
 
With regard to methodologies, I have focused on the qualitative approach, on the 
assumption that, as a data-gathering method, it will yield complex and densely-
nuanced evidence. As anticipated at the start of the research, the findings from the 
one quantitative research study consulted (see Chapter 3.2), which investigated, 
inter alia, self-respect in the lives of the heroin users, were found to be 
problematic. The concept was not contextualised and the opportunity to infer the 
ways in which it functioned in the lives of the research subjects was restricted.  
                                                        
23 In a rare interview, given in 1980 (Verhoeven 2000), Goffman describes himself as a ‘structural 
functionalist’ (p. 213) and a ‘positivist’ (p. 219), dissociating himself from ethnomethodology (p. 
221), symbolic interactionism (pp. 226–8) and social constructionism (pp. 218, 231–2). He aligns 
himself with Robert Merton and Talcott Parsons, saying of the latter: ‘Parsons … provided, in The 
Structure of Social Action, at the time, the first statement that it was reasonable to be thinking in 
theoretical terms, … he provided something of an epistemology that I’ve always found congenial 
and reasonable’ (p. 219). 
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A diverse collection of qualitative methods has been applied to analysing the 
evidence of the functioning of respect and self-respect found in the selected 
studies, be they in-depth interviews, reports based on participant observation, or 
written texts. Arguably, this scatter-gun approach is appropriate, given the 
different dimensions of respect and self-respect that have been considered.24 
Analysis of demeanour and deference rituals and discourse analyses such as 
warranting voice and positioning have proved useful in exploring face-to-face 
interactions. Other techniques such as game theory and conversation analysis may 
also yield useful insights. Where the actions of one individual or group in an 
interaction is the focus of interest, other analytical methods, such as critical 
discourse analysis, rational choice and risk theory, and discourse analysis around 
interpretive repertoires and self-narratives, have been found useful.  
 
Although I have not specifically explored methods for analysing the functioning 
of respect at the level of social collectivities, reference was made in Chapter 2.3 
to the potential of Coser’s (1956) analysis of the functions of conflict in society 
for understanding how respect functions at the social, as opposed to the 
individual, level. Network analysis may also yield useful insights into how people 
organise themselves with a view to obtaining and maintaining social respect.  
 
In the course of the dissertation I have discussed a number of issues that could 
affect the validity of the researcher’s interpretation of the functioning of respect 
and self-respect.25 They include instances of false respect and contested 
                                                        
24 Organising his study of the situation of inmates in asylums in four separate, unrelated essays, 
written from different sociological vantage points, Goffman (1961) pleads the undeveloped state 
of the discipline of sociology. He suggests that each approach needs to be used where it best 
applies and only then should its wider connections in the family of sociological thought be 
explored: ‘Better, perhaps, different coats to clothe the children well than a single splendid tent in 
which they all shiver’ (p. 11).  
25 Validity in qualitative research is not regarded as an independent test applied to the process, as 
much as an ongoing state of mind, the application of continuous philosophical rigour to the 
research effort: ‘A valid argument is sound, well grounded, justifiable, strong and convincing’ 
(Kvale 1996: 236); ‘judgements of validity … concern your conceptual and ontological clarity, 
and the success with which you have translated these into a meaningful and relevant epistemology’ 
(Mason 2001: 188). Kvale and Mason both talk about validity in the context of the ‘quality’ of the 
research, or the ‘craft’ as Kvale calls it. Kvale (1996: 242–244) describes three critical dispositions 
that contribute to ensuring valid research: continual ‘checking’ of assumptions and procedures; 
continual interrogation of the epistemological basis of the analysis and interpretation of the data; 
and ongoing theorising about the nature of the data generated. 
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allegations of disrespect or lack of respect, the need for careful consideration of 
the context and timing of data sources, and the need reflexivity. The issue of 
whether it is necessary for a researcher to have respect for her research subjects 
has also arisen in several contexts. 
 
Insofar as respect is a rational process, I suggest it is necessary for the researcher 
to have respect for her research subjects as rational beings. If the researcher does 
not accord her research subjects respect, she will not be able to demonstrate 
conclusively how they make use of respect in their lives. In Chapter 2.2, I noted 
that sociologists in the symbolic interactionist tradition argued the need for 
respect between researcher and researched in order both to access important 
sources of data and to obtain accurate data. These research studies were all found 
to provide convincing evidence of the importance of respect and self-respect in 
the lives of their research subjects. On the other hand, in Chapter 4.2, in 
discussing the work of Adler (1985), it was noted that she indicated a lack of 
respect for her research subjects. I suggest that this lack of respect weakens the 
validity of some of her findings. She describes the importance of institutional 
recognition-respect in the functioning of the community’s ‘prestige hierarchy’ but 
does not see self-respect as being important in the lives of these hedonistic 
‘outsiders’. Self-respect may not have been important to her research subjects, 
which is why it is not described; however, her lack of regard for her research 
subjects may account for the failure to find evidence of self-respect among these 
research subjects. 
 
To return to the problem outlined in the introduction, the ‘respect deficit’ in 
modern Western societies between public commitments to ensuring that every 
member of society enjoys respect and the widely-perceived lack of respect among 
members of socially-excluded groups, I believe that investigating social exclusion 
through the prism of the functioning of respect and self-respect in society has 
certain advantages. It facilitates the study of all individuals and groups in society 
within a single framework, constructed around their interactions relating to the 
functioning of respect and self-respect. No individual’s or group’s perspective on 
the grounds for, or functioning of respect, is privileged. It is a dynamic framework 
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which can respond to and accommodate changes in the circumstances of any 
individual or group over time.  
 
Erving Goffman’s account of the interaction order was proposed earlier in this 
chapter, as an appropriate framework for thinking about how respect and self-
respect function in everyday social life. Judith Shklar’s discussion about the 
importance of ‘character’ in political life is now proposed as a useful way of 
thinking about how this interaction framework is animated in relation to respect 
and self-respect. Having questioned the sincerity of respect as a moral process 
(see Chapter 1.1), Shklar argues that we should not seek out ethical and moral 
principles as a means of understanding and explaining contemporary political and 
social life, but rather pursue an understanding of ‘character’. Character will enable 
us to find an acceptable balance between the unresolvable conflicts, 
contradictions, uncertainties and complexities that are inherent in modern liberal 
democracies. In the following quotation, replace ‘most politics’ with ‘the 
functioning of respect and self-respect in everyday social life’ and Judith Shklar’s 
words read as an apt summary of the main conclusion of this dissertation:  
Most politics are not a question of stark choices at all; they involve bargains, 
incremental decisions, adaptations, rituals, display, argument, persuasion, and the 
like. …What we look for in both public officials and our friends is character. Not 
a set of discrete, heroic, ethically significant decisions, but the imperceptible 
choices of dispositions that are manifest in the course of a lifetime. And character 
is an indissoluble amalgam of motives and calculations. (Shklar 1984: 242, 243)  
 
An investigative approach that examines the functioning of respect and self-
respect within a single interactive framework, integrating such disparate concepts 
as power and dominance, respectability, responsibility, identity, stigmatisation, 
pride and shame, has the capacity to yield valuable insights into how modern 
Western societies include some and exclude others. 
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